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DEFAMATION IN FICTION: WITH MALICE TOWARD
NONE AND PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR ALL
I. INTRODUCTION
In August, 1979, the story of a Miss America contestant who
twirled the baton and performed acts of fellatio on her coach appeared
in Penthouse magazine. Three months later, Kimberli Jayne Pring filed
suit. She claimed the story was about her, and that she had been
defamed.'
Until that time, defamation in fiction2 was ignored by leading tort
scholars. Writing of defamation in 1976, one commentator stated that
litigation in fiction is "extremely rare and the law is undeveloped; the
instances in which liability on such bases may be constitutionally im-
posed seem ... to be quite limited.' '3 Three years later, the California
Supreme Court upheld a $75,000 verdict against author Gwen Mitchell
and her publisher, Doubleday, for libeling Paul Bindrim in the' novel
Touching 4 In 1980, a Wyoming jury awarded Kimberli Pring $26.5
million in damages in her defamation suit against Penthouse maga-
zine.5 The same year, a New York jury awarded $60,0006 to two men
who claimed that they had been libeled by their depiction as "violent
criminals" in an allegorical painting by artist Paul Georges, entitled
"The Mugging of the Muse."I
1. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
2. The terminology "defamation in fiction" as used in this comment, means an action
for damages for libel by a plaintiff who asserts that he or she is in fact the subject of a
putative work of fiction, or can reasonably be identified with the subject, and has been
defamed.
3. Hill, Defamation and Privacy Under the First Amendment, 76 COLuM. L. REv. 1205,
1299 (1976).
4. Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29 (1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 984 (1979).
5. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
6. Silberman v. Georges, No. 22116/75 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). In the painting three
male figures obviously wearing masks, two of which resembled plaintiffs' faces, are attacking
a partially nude young woman draped in red cloth on a city street. A winged cherub watch-
es from nearby and a fire hydrant spews blood into the street. Siani and Silberman claimed
that the painting accused them of being violent criminals thereby damaging their
reputations.
7. See R. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER, AND RELATED PROBLEMS 85 (1980) (A painting can
form the basis of an action for defamation. "The manner of publication of defamation is
immaterial .... It may be effected by spoken or written language, by photograph, draw-
ing, gesture or technique not yet imagined ....").
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Although the law has long recognized that fiction can be libelous, 8
these recent jury awards9 evidence the modem viability of the tort and
suggest that defamation judgments based on works of fiction may have
a significant impact on the publishing industry and on free expres-
sion. 10 This comment traces the tort of defamation in fiction from its
strict liability inception, through the abrogation of strict liability ac-
complished by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, ' to its reversion to
strict liability in the contemporary setting.
12
This comment is divided into three sections. The first section ana-
lyzes the basis of liability for defamation in fiction under the common
law. 3 This section analyzes the three categories of fiction cases,' 4 and
8. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564, comment d (1977):
A libel may be published of an actual person by a story or essay, novel, play or
moving picture that is intended to deal only with fictitious characters if the charac-
ters or plot bear such a resemblance to actual persons or events as to make it rea-
sonable for its readers or audience to understand that a particular character is
intended to portray that person ....
9. See supra notes 4-6.
10. The impact on the publishing industry is two-fold. First, a private person suing a
media defendant for libel must first prove "fault." See infra text accompanying notes 194-
98. One commentator notes that the determination of "fault" necessitates an inquiry into
the editorial process which pressures the news media to conform to professional norms, as
yet undefined. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 647 (1978). For example,
Crown Books was spurred to make last-minute changes in the paperback edition of The
Spike because of a threat of a libel action by the Institute for Policy Studies (IPS). In the
new edition, the left-wing Institute for Political Reform - widely believed to be modeled on
IPS - was turned into the Foundation for Progressive Reform, and its European office
moved to Brussels from Amsterdam, where the IPS European affiliate is located. Marcus,
The Reality Question: When Does Libel Law Intrude on Creativity?, 3 NAT'L L.J., June 8,
1981 at 2, col. 3.
Second, there is an economic impact on the industry because of sizeable jury awards
and costs to defend. An Illinois jury awarded plaintiff Green $6.7 million in compensatory
and $2.5 million in punitive damages for his libel suit against the Alton Telegraph. The case
resulted from a 1969 investigation by reporters on the newspaper who recounted to the Jus-
tice Department possible connections between organized crime figures and officials of the
Alton Savings and Loan Association. The Alton Telegraph never ran a story covering the
investigation; however, the bank withdrew its credit from Green who was forced to abandon
several projects. See L.A. Daily Journal (August 3, 1981) at 5, col. 3. The newspaper subse-
quently settled out of court for $1.4 million. See L.A. Daily Journal (June 2, 1982) at 1, col.
3.
11. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). In New York Times, an elected official brought suit against a
newspaper, claiming that he had been libeled by an advertisement appearing in the paper.
The Supreme Court held that under the first and fourteenth amendments, the public official
was not entitled to damages for defamation relating to his official conduct unless he proved
"actual malice," that is, that the statement was made with "knowledge that it was false or
with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id at 279-80. See infra text accom-
panying notes 153-62 for discussion of abrogation of strict liability.
12. See infra text accompanying note 210.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 22-48.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 49-118.
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evaluates five techniques for establishing or avoiding liability under the
common law. 5 The second section analyzes the impact of constitu-
tional defamation law on the common law tort,16 and argues that the
first amendment malice test derived from New York Times'7 and the
punitive damage standard set forth in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. 11
have been misapplied to fiction. This misapplication, if not corrected,
will have the unintended effect of reinstituting strict liability for defa-
mation in a work of fiction. 9 The third section suggests a definition of
fault to comply with the requirements of Gertz for defamation in
fiction.20 It also proposes a new standard of liability, based upon a
modification of the New York Times test, in this type of libel action.
2'
II. COMMON LAW BASIS OF LIABILITY
A. Character of Tort - Strict Liability
Defamation, the legal remedy for injury to reputation, has been a
strict liability tort since its common law inception.22 The rationale un-
derlying the tort is the belief that one's reputation is important to soci-
ety, and that a statement that threatens the well-being of the individual,
threatens society.23 The tort of defamation, therefore, serves three pur-
poses: vindication of one's good name, compensation for harm, and
deterrence.24 Although plaintiffs generally have sued to obtain a public
declaration that they were improperly treated, adequate vindication of
one's reputation often "require[d] compensatory or punitive dam-
ages."'2 This rationale and these purposes, which underlie the tort of
defamation generally, apply equally when a plaintiff is libeled by a
work of fiction.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 119-52.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 153-307.
17. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See supra note 11 and infra text accompanying notes 153-62.
18. 418 U.S. 323 (1974). Gertz held that a private individual suing a publisher or broad-
caster for a defamatory falsehood could not recover presumed or punitive damages unless he
proved actual malice. See infra text accompanying notes 177-79.
19. See infra text accompanying note 210.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 308-50.
21. See infra text accompanying notes 351-62.
22. See L. ELDREDGE, THE LAW OF DEFAMATION 6 & 14 (1978).
23. This common law principle is reflected in the thinking of the Supreme Court. See
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoted with approval in
Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974)) ("Mhe individual's right to the protection of his own good
name 'reflects no more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every
human being' - a concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty.").
24. See ELDREDGE, supra note 22, at 3.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 901 comment c (1977).
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Although defamation was a strict liability tort before the time of
the Norman Conquest,26 it was not until early in this century that a
work of fiction was held to be defamatory. In Hulon & Co. v. Jones, 
2 7
an English case decided in 1910, the House of Lords held a newspaper
publisher strictly liable for a work of fiction. The story, "Motor-Mad
Dieppe. . .." described a scene at the French seaside during the motor
races. It was supposed to be an amusing article about a churchwarden,
Artemus Jones, who led an austere life while in England, but who be-
came the "life and soul of a gay little band" while abroad.2 8 Plaintiff
Thomas Artemus Jones, a lawyer and a journalist, claimed to have
been defamed.
Defendants argued that they did not know, nor had they ever
heard of Jones, and that they had not intended to libel him.29 The
House of Lords reasoned that "[n]egligence does not enter into defama-
tion," nor "was it necessary to show that the author of a libel intended
it to refer to the plaintiff."30 The House of Lords unanimously held
that "a person charged with libel cannot defend himself by showing
that he intended in his own breast not to defame the plaintiff. He has
none the less imputed something disgraceful, and has none the less in-
jured the plaintiff."3
The first reported case of defamation in fiction thus established
that an author could be found liable despite proof that he or she had
not intended to write about the plaintiff, or that the story was written in
a benevolent spirit. In short, English courts established early that defa-
mation in fiction is a strict liability tort. Before liability was imposed,
however, the plaintiff had to satisfy an objective test, namely, that rea-
sonable readers would conclude that the fictional article referred to the
plaintiff. The House of Lords quoted from the instructions to the jury
which phrased the test as follows:
The real point upon which your verdict must turn is: Ought
or ought not sensible and reasonable people reading this arti-
26. See Veeder, History and Theory of the Law of Defamation, 3 COLUM. L. REv. 546
(1903).
27. 101 L.T.R. 831 (1910). See infra text accompanying notes 59-62 for discussion of
Hutton in the "same name" category.
28. Id at 832.
29. Id
30. Id Although the Hulton court stated that negligence and intent were not necessary
elements of defamation in fiction, and held the defendants strictly liable, its use of the
concepts of negligence and intent should be distinguished from the modem concept of fault.
See infra notes 194-98 and accompanying text for development of the concept of fault'in




cle to think that it was a mere imaginary person such as I have
said - Tom Jones, Mr. Pecksniff as a humbug, Mr. Stiggins
or any name of that sort which one reads in literature used as
a type? If you think that any reasonable person would think
that, it is not actionable at all. If, on the other hand, you do
not think that, but think that people would suppose it to mean
some real person, those who did not know the plaintiff of
course would not know who the real person was, but those
who did know of the existence of the plaintiff would think
that it was the plaintiff; then the action is maintainable
32
As initially stated, the objective reasonable reader test had two ele-
ments: (1) whether the reader believed that the story referred to a real
person, or merely to a literary type; and (2) whether the reader be-
lieved that the story referred to the plaintiff.
33
The English concept of strict liability for a work of fiction was
introduced into American common law in Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill
Co. 34 In Corrigan, the New York Court of Appeal relied on Hulton to
hold an Indiana publisher of a novel strictly liable for compensatory
damages.35 Responding to the publisher's argument that its editors
were unaware of the New York plaintiff and did not intend to injure
him,36 the court wryly observed that "[t]he question is not so much who
was aimed at as who was hit."
37
The rationale underlying these foundational cases is that an author
or publisher cannot esape liability by the "varnish of fiction"' 38 or by
the defense that the defamation was unintended. Whether the author or
publisher intended to injure the plaintiff is relevant, however, to the
propriety of an award of punitive damages.39
32. Id at 832-33. See infra note 46 and accompanying text for development of the rea-
sonable reader test in American common law.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 321-24, and 327-34 for a proposed adaptation of
this test.
34. 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920). See infra text accompanying notes 49-53 for dis-
cussion of "venomous pen" category and infra notes 235-38 for the distinction between an
author's and a publisher's liability.
35. 228 N.Y. at 64, 126 N.E. at 262.
36. Id at 63, 126 N.E. at 262.
37. Id at 64, 126 N.E. at 262.
38. Id at 72, 126 N.E. at 265.
39. Id at 65, 126 N.E. at 263. The court stated that the defendant was strictly liable for
compensatory damages, but punitive damages required a showing of intent to injure. The
case was reversed and remanded for proof on the issue of intent for punitive damages. Id at
72, 126 N.E. at 265.
1983]
LOYOL,4 OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 16
B. Proof of Defamation Under the Common Law
Under the common law, a plaintiff carried the burden of proving
five basic elements: (1) defamatory words relating to the plaintiff; (2)
publication to third parties; (3) falsity of facts; (4) malice, actual or im-
plied; and (5) injury.40 The first element required proof of two compo-
nents: (a) that the defendant used defamatory words, that is, words
that held the plaintiff up to ridicule, hatred, contempt, scorn, obloquy,
or shame;41 and (b) that the words were "of and concerning" the plain-
tiff.42 Upon proof of the first and second elements, the third, fourth,
and fifth elements were conclusively presumed,43 shifting the burden of
proof to a defendant to establish a recognized defense, usually truth or
privilege. 4
What is distinctive about the tort of defamation in fiction is the
difficulty of establishing that the defamatory words are "of and con-
cerning" the plaintiff. Typically, the plaintiff sets forth the similarities
between the plaintiff and the character in the challenged work of
fiction, while the defendant catalogs the dissimilarities. The trier of
fact45 then compares the plaintiff's characteristics to those of the char-
acter in the story. This is known as the process of identification. 6 This
40. See R.WINFIELD, LIBEL LITIGATION 167-68 (1979).
41. Triggs v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 179 N.Y. 144, 154, 71 N.E. 739, 742
(1904) ("A written or printed statement or article published. . . which is false, and tends to
injure his reputation, and thereby expose him to public hatred, contempt, scorn, obloquy, or
shame, is libelous per se."). For a list of statements which have been found to constitute libel
per se, see generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 757-58 (3d. ed. 1964). Such state-
ments include: plaintiff refuses to pay his just debts, is immoral, unchaste, queer, has wife
trouble, is about to be divorced, is a coward, a crook, liar, scandal-monger, anarchist, bas-
tard, eunuch, or even a rotten egg. Id
42. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564 (1977).
43. See WINFIELD, supra note 40, at 168.
44. Id These five elements were required for proof of defamation in all cases under the
common law. See infra notes 316-50 and accompanying text for a proposed modification
of these elements for defamation in fiction necessitated by the Gertz fault requirement.
45. See Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636, 640 (2d Cir. 1980). Determining if the "of
and concerning" requirement has been met is an issue for the trier of fact.
46. Smith v. Huntington Publishing Co., 410 F. Supp. 1270 (S.D. Ohio, (1975)) ("IT]he
publication must refer to some person and the plaintiff must show that he is the person about
whom the statement was made .... The... rule has been qualified somewhat in the
context of fictional characters . . . . The test is neither the intent of the author, nor the
recognition by the plaintiff that the article might be about him. The test is whether a reason-
able person could reasonably believe that the article referred to the plaintiff."). Id at 1273.
Compare Bindrim v. Mitchell, 92 Cal. App. 3d 61, 78, 155 Cal. Rptr. 29, 39 (1979) ("The test
is whether a reasonable person, reading the book, would understand that the fictional char-
acter therein pictured was, in actual fact, the plaintiff acting as described."); Middlebrooks v.
Curtis Publishing Co., 413 F.2d 141, 142 (4th Cir. 1969) ("test is whether the fictional char-
acter could reasonably be understood as a portrayal of the plaintiff"). Some courts have
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process is significant because once a plaintiff meets the test that the
libelous matter is "of and concerning" him, the law implies malice and
infers some damage.47 The nature and quality of evidence needed to
sustain the plaintiff's burden of proof have never been established.
Decisions made on a case by case basis have failed to provide predict-
able standards for authors and publishers of fiction anxious to avoid
litigation.4"
C. Categories of Cases
While all of the cases of defamation in fiction turn on the issue of
identification, the cases can be divided into three distinct fact patterns:
(1) cases where the author intentionally uses a purported work of
fiction to injure reputation ["venomous pen"]; (2) cases involving the
accidental use of another's name ["same name"]; and (3) cases where a
character modeled on an actual person is unsuccessfully disguised
["failed disguise"].
1. Venomous pen
In one distinct category of cases, the author intends that the reader
will understand who the character represents. The work is entitled
fiction. Names are changed. But the author intends the reader to see
the similarities and parallels between the character and the plaintiff in
order to injure the plaintiff's reputation. This category might be termed
the "venomous pen" case.
Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co.,49 the first American case holding an
author liable for defamation in a work of fiction, illustrates this fact
pattern. In Corrigan, the Honorable Joseph E. Corrigan, a New York
City magistrate, brought a libel action against the publisher of the
novel God's Man. so The novel depicts an ostensibly fictitious judge
named Cornigan as ignorant, brutal, corrupt, and despicable.
The plaintiff in Corrigan pointed to a number of similarities to
satisfy the "of and concerning" test. The author had used the barely
fictitious name of Cornigan; the table of contents described the court-
room events as "Justice - a la Corigan," a misspelling virtually identi-
gone further. Cf. Wheeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 300 F.2d 372, 376 (7th Cir. 1962) ("average
reader"); Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276, 280 (D. Minn. 1947) ("sensible reader").
47. Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co., 228 N.Y. 58, 65, 126 N.E. 260, 263 (1920).
48. See SACK, supra note 7, at xxvii.
49. 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920). See supra text accompanying notes 34-39 for
discussion of strict liability and infra text accompanying notes 235-38 for distinction between
an author's and publisher's liability in Corrigan.
50. The novel was written by George Bronson Howard.
19831
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cal to the plaintiff's name; and the character in the novel was a
magistrate in the same court where the plaintiff frequently presided.5'
The court noted that the author was full of hate and bitterness toward
plaintiff due to his personal experience before the magistrate as a de-
fendant on a criminal charge,52 and had used the unsavory details and
a "venomous pen" to vilify plaintiff.3 The court sustained the award of
$25,000 in compensatory damages, and remanded for retrial on the is-
sue of punitive damages.
Similarly, in Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Stanley, 14 a prison com-
missioner won a judgment for $100,000 based on the reckless dissemi-
nation of advertisements for the film, "I Was A Fugitive From A Chain
Gang. '5 5 The film was an adaptation of Robert Burns' novel 1Am A
Fugitive From A Georgia Chain-Gang. Author Burns, who served on a
chain gang until his escape from prison, charged that Commissioner
Stanley transferred him from one chain gang to another because Burns
had refused to pay Stanley a bribe. 6
The court noted that the advertisements clearly indicated that the
film was based on an evidently defamatory novel and reasoned that
defendants never verified the truth of the statements in the advertise-
ments. 7 Since the statements were never verified, the court found that
the defendants "recklessly disseminated" the charges of cruelty and
bribery for profit and held the defendants liable for punitive
damages.5
While there are only two reported cases which illustrate the "ven-
omous pen" category, the courts appear disposed to uphold recoveries
for both compensatory and punitive damages on a showing of intent to
injure or reckless disregard for injury. This disposition becomes all but
irresistible when the varnish of fiction is too thin to cover the venomous
intent.
51. Id at 62, 126 N.E. at 262.
52. Id at 68, 126 N.E. at 264.
53. Id at 65, 126 N.E. at 263.
54. 192 S.E. 300 (Ga. Ct. App. 1937).
55. The suit was not simply for the exhibition of the picture, but for the exhibition of a
picture as advertised to have been based on a particular book. The advertisements included
such phrases as: "They can't let me go now." "I've seen too much." "I've been flogged,
sweated, tortured." 'They've got to get me . . " 'They've got to shut me up because
.Id at 305.






In the "same name" category of fiction cases, the author, although
ignorant of the plaintiff's existence, gives the fictional character a name
that is identical to the plaintiffs.
In the English case, Hulton & Co. v. Jones, 59 a Manchester newspa-
per printed a story to the effect that one Artemus Jones, a married
churchwarden from Peckham, had been seen at Dieppe with a woman
who was not his wife.60 When the story appeared, a real Thomas
Artemus Jones, generally known as Artemus Jones, sued for libel.
Plaintiff, who was neither married, a churchwarden, nor from Peckham
claimed that his neighbors recognized him as the Artemus Jones in the
story. The defendant publishers contended that they had never heard
of the plaintiff, that the name Artemus Jones was entirely fictitious, and
that the character was only intended to represent a type.6 1 Except for
the similarity in name, the character's description did not correspond to
the plaintiff. Nevertheless, the court affirmed an award of £1,750 in
damages because, in the opinion of the jury, a substantial number of
readers who knew the plaintiff would believe that the article referred to
hM.62
Hulton is the single reported case in which a plaintiff satisfied the
"of and concerning" test by the use of an identical name without fur-
ther similarities. By contrast, American courts have tended to require
more than a showing that plaintiff's name was identical to a character's.
For example, in Clare v. Farrell 63 author James T. Farrell and Van-
guard Press were sued for libel in the novel Bernard Clare. The Minne-
sota plaintiff with the same name as the character, Bernard Clare,
based his claim on the theory that the novel chronicled the experiences
of an aspiring writer who had the same name, profession, and appear-
ance as the plaintifff a' Farrell, living and writing in New York, had
never heard of plaintiff. His working drafts indicated that the name
Bernard Clare was selected because the principal character was to be of
Irish extraction; the surname "Clare" evolved from the spelling
"Claire" to "Clare," after County Clare in Ireland.6"
59. 101 L.T.R. 831 (1910). See supra text accompanying notes 27-33 for discussion of
strict liability in Hulto
60. The alleged libel: "Whist. There is Artemus Jones with a woman who is not his
wife, who must be - you know - the other thing." Id at 832.
61. Id
62. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33 & 46.
63. 70 F. Supp. 276 (D.Minn. 1947).
64. Id at 277.
65. Id
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Plaintiff Clare additionally argued that Farrell had been negligent
in his failure to exercise reasonable care to discover the existence of the
real newspaperman with the same name.66 The court found this claim
"astonishing," and stated that writers of fiction cannot be required to
"search among all the records available in this Nation. . .to deter-
mine whether perchance one of the characters. . . may have the same
name and occupation as a real person. 67 The court granted Farrell's
motion for summary judgment holding insufficient plaintiffs showing
of coincidental use of the same name.68
In the "same name" category of fiction cases, although the English
courts have held for plaintiff, American courts have held to the con-
trary. It is unlikely that plaintiffs can recover in libel actions based on
a showing of a fortuitous use of another's name.69
3. Failed disguise
In the "failed disguise" category of fiction cases, an author draws
upon a real-life model for his novel and disguises the model through
dissimilarities. The disguised model can be an ordinary citizen or a
newsworthy person. If a reasonable reader could recognize the charac-
ter to be the plaintiff, the disguise fails, and liability may follow.70
66. Id at 278.
67. Id at 279.
68. Id at 281. Cf. Geisler v. Petrocelli, 616 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1980). Plaintiff sued au-
thor and publisher for libel in Match Set. The book described a female transsexual tennis
player who unscrupulously manipulates the outcome of tournaments. Both character and
plaintiff have the same name. Both are young, attractive, honey-blondes with firm compact
bodies. Plaintiff alleged that she was neither a transsexual tennis player, nor a manipulator
of tennis tournaments. The court noted that author and plaintiff were employed by the same
publishing company at the same time, and they were acquainted. The court held that Gei-
sler was improperly denied the opportunity to adduce a full record on the "of and concern-
ing" element before the trier of fact. Judgment to dismiss her complaint was reversed. Id at
638.
69. See Maggio v. Charles Scribner's Sons, 130 N.Y.S.2d 514 (1954) (Author Jones' use
of character's name, Angelo Maggio, in novel From Here To Eternity, inspired by plaintiff
Joseph A. Maggio, held insufficient to state a cause of action). Use of business and profes-
sional names has also been held insufficient to state a cause of action. See Landau v. Co-
lumbia Broadcasting System, 128 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1954) (Use of name, Credit Consultant,
Inc., on door of fictional detective's office in television program "Crime Photographer" held
insufficient to state a cause of action by plaintiff whose trade name was Credit Consultant);
University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 256 N.Y.S. 2d 301
(1965) (motion to enjoin distribution of film, "John Goldfarb, Please Come Home," denied
for use of name of university); Dauer & Fittipaldi, Inc. v. Twenty First Century Communi-
cations, Inc., 43 A.D.2d 178, 349 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1973) (use of name of bar and grill, "Busy
Bee," in a short story held insufficient to state a cause of action).
70. See supra notes 32-33 & 46 and accompanying text.
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a. disguised ordinary citizens
Several of the failed disguise cases were brought by ordinary citi-
zens. In these cases, an author modeled a character on a childhood
friend, relative, neighbor or acquaintance and attempted to obscure the
model with dissimilarities. The author may even have forgotten that he
or she was drawing on past relationships and may simply have no rec-
ollection of the model. Typically, a plaintiff not in the public eye who
alleges a failed disguise must first prove that he is in fact the model for
the character. Generally, he does this by proving that he once knew the
author.
In Feler v. Houghton MYiin Co.,7 the plaintiff sued his brother,
the author, claiming that he was the model for the chief character in the
novel, The Travelers, a thinly disguised family history. The defamation
charge was based upon the chief character's cooperation with a Nazi
organization for "easy money" and that character's abandonment of
his dying father in "frantic pursuit" of monetary gain.72 Both plaintiff
and character were the first born children in families of thirteen, their
fathers were ministers, and the families gave concerts in Europe while
traveling in an old bus.73 Based on these similarities the Second Circuit
reasoned that because the events in the story and in real life were often
parallel,74 there was sufficient evidence of identification to make it in-
appropriate to grant summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
75
Other courts have been more sympathetic to the need of an author
to write out of his own experience. In Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing
Co., 76 the author and publisher avoided liability for the story "Moon-
shine Light, Moonshine Bright. 77 The story described the exploits of
Esco Brooks, an unsavory character modeled after the author's child-
hood friend. It relied on actual place names and geographical settings.
Nevertheless, the court found marked dissimilarities, including differ-
ences between plaintiff and the fictional character with respect to age
71. 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966). Two years prior to Fetler, the Supreme Court decided
New York Times. The case had little immediate impact on defamation in fiction, and the
constitutional malice standard was not applied to an action for defamation in fiction until
1979 in Bindrim. See supra text accompanying notes 93-95.
72. Id
73. Id at 651. Plaintiffoffered the following additional similarities between himself and
the character Maxim: a family of thirteen, of whom 10 were boys and the third, fourth and
eighth children were girls; both were 23 in 1938, Latvian by descent, and lived in Stockholm.
74. Id at 652.
75. Id at 654.
76. 413 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1969).
77. The story was published in the Saturday Evening Post, March 16, 1963.
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and employment. The court also noted that plaintiff no longer resided
in South Carolina, the setting of the story, and that the life of the plain-
tiff and the character were not parallel.78 These dissimilarities sup-
ported a finding against the reasonableness of identification. 9
b. disguised newsworthy personali/es
In the "disguised newsworthy personality" category, an author
models the character on a person who is already known to the general
public. The newsworthy personality may be an athlete, a princess, a
politician, or a notorious criminal. The person is disguised, but the
disguise fails and the reader recognizes the plaintiff.
In Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd, 80 the Eng-
lish Court of Appeal held that reasonable people could identify the
plaintiff, Princess Irina Alexandrovna of Russia, with the fictional char-
acter, Princess Natasha, in the film, "Rasputin, the Mad Monk."'" The
court sustained a sizeable award of £25,000 to Princess Irina, who
claimed that she was defamed in the film in which the ostensibly
fictional Princess Natasha is seduced and raped by Rasputin.82 Prior to
the film, Princess Irina's husband, Prince Youssoupoff, had published a
widely-circulated nonfictional account of his part in the murder of
Rasputin.8 3 In the film version, the fictional Prince Chegodieff is por-
trayed as a participant in the assassination, and the murder occurs in a
palace on the Moika River owned by the Youssoupoff family. Based on
these similarities the court concluded that the jury reasonably could
have identified Prince Youssoupoff with the fictional Prince Chegodieff
and could have drawn the inference that the fictional Princess Natasha,
who is likely to marry Chegodieff, was the counterpart of Princess
Irina.84 Thus, in the first case involving defamation of a character
modeled on a newsworthy personality, the disguise failed and the
plaintiff recovered.
In Brown v. Paramount Publix Corp.,8 - the plaintiff sued for defa-
78. 413 F.2d at 143.
79. Id See supra notes 32-33 & 46 and accompanying text.
80. 50 T.L.R. 581 (C.A. 1934). See infra notes 120-22 and accompanying text for use of
disclaimer in Youssoupoff.
81. Id at 583. See supra notes 32-33 & 46 and accompanying text.
82. Id at 581-82.
83. Id at 583.
84. Id Relying on Hutton, the court suggested that "reasonable people, not all reason-
able people, but many reasonable people would take the film ... as representing and refer-
ring to the plaintiff." Id
85. 240 A.D. 520, 270 N.Y.S. 544 (1934).
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mation in the film "An American Tragedy," adapted from the novel of
the same title. The book, written by Theodore Dreiser, was drawn
from events in a newspaper clipping. Both novel and film portrayed a
girl's murder by drowning at Big Moose Lake. Grace Brown's boy-
friend, Chester Gillette, was tried and executed for a similar crime.
The plaintiff, who was the mother of the murdered girl, claimed she
was defamed by her portrayal as an illiterate, unkempt, slovenly, low-
grade person who neglected her daughter and permitted her to carry on
clandestine relations with Gillette.8 6 Based on the similarities between
the characters, locations, scenes and incidents in the life of Gillette and
Brown, the court held that "the public [would] believe that the [film]
portrayed plaintiffs life." 7 Brown mirrored the precedent set in Yous-
soupoff and held the defendant liable for imperfectly disguising a char-
acter modeled on a person incidentally involved in a scandalous crime.
By contrast, in Wheeler v. DellPublishing Co., 18 another failed dis-
guise case, the court affirmed an award of summary judgment in favor
of the novel's publisher and the motion picture producer. In an odd
twist of reasoning, the court fallaciously suggested that the character in
the novel could not be identified with the plaintiff because the false
nature of the libel rendered the character dissimilar to the plaintiff. 9
In heeler, the widow of Maurice Chenoweth sued for libel in the
novel and motion picture, Anatomy of a Murder. 9 0 The novel was a
fictionalized account of the murder trial of Lieutenant Peterson, who
shot and killed Chenoweth following Chenoweth's "rape" of Peterson's
wife. The court conceded that the locale of the book was fairly identifi-
able with the actual locale; that those who knew of the Peterson trial
would identify it with the fictional trial of Lieutenant Manion; that
Barney Quill was the fictional counterpart of Maurice Chenoweth, and
that John Voelker would be identified as Paul Biegler, the fictional de-
fense attorney.9' After noting these conscious parallels, it seemed likely
that the court would concede that plaintiff Wheeler was identifiable as
the "fictional" character Janice Quill. In a curious misapplication of
86. Id at 520-21, 270 N.Y.S. at 546.
87. Id. at 521, 270 N.Y.S. at 546.
88. 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962).
89. Id at 376.
90. Id at 374. Wheeler alleged that she was defamed by the "foul" language and "unsa-
vory characteristics" of the character, Janice Quill, "'that dame with the dyed red hair and
livid scar on her right cheek who had sworn at him in everything but Arabian. . . .Who'd
ever forget such a noisy foul-mouthed harridan?"'
91. Id at 375-76. The book, published under the nom deplume of Robert Traver, was
written by John Voelker, the Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of Michigan who had
served as Peterson's attorney.
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defamation logic, however, the court stated that reasonable readers
would not identify Wheeler with Janice Quill because "the author cre-
ated the latter in an ugly way so that none [of the book's readers] would
identify her with Hazel Wheeler."
92
By awarding summary judgment to defendants on the "of and
concerning" issue, the court denied plaintiff the opportunity to estab-
lish that movie audiences understood that the film referred to her.
However, the suggestion that because of the uncomplimentary por-
trayal no one who knew the real widow could reasonably identify her
with the fictional widow, only affirms the conclusion that the depiction
is defamatory and does not negative the element of identification. If
Wheeler could show that people did identify her with Janice Quill, she
should have recovered. Although the unsavory characteristics ascribed
to Janice Quill should have gone to the issue of damages, they were
used in the Wheeler case to support the argument that the disguise was
successful.
Two recent cases, Bindrim v. Mitchell93 and Pring v. Penthouse
Int'l, Ltd,9 4 involve failed disguises of newsworthy personalities.
These cases were tried on a combination of common law and constitu-
tional defamation law theories.95 Prior to reaching the constitutional
issues, however, both plaintiffs needed to establish the identification be-
tween the character and themselves. 96
In Bindrim the character was modeled on a person known profes-
sionally to the author. Author Mitchell had attended Dr. Bindrim's
"nude therapy" sessions for two months when she entered into a con-
tract with Doubleday for a novel describing nude therapy. 97 In the
novel Touching, Mitchell described "Nude Marathon" group therapy
in which patients "shed their psychological inhibitions with the re-
92. Id at 376.
93. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 29, cer. denied, 444 U.S. 984 (1979).
-94. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
95. Bindrim was the first case of defamation in fiction tried under the constitutional
malice standard. "As a public figure, plaintiff is precluded from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to him, unless he proved. . . 'actual malice'. . . ." 92 Cal.
App. 3d at 72, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35 (citing New York Times, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964)).
96. Id at 73 n.2, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35 n.2 ("The fact that 'Touching' was a novel does not
necessarily insulate Mitchell from liability for libel, if all the elements of libel are otherwise
present.").
97. Id at 69-70, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 33. The trial court struck the contract issue. On
appeal, the court affirmed the dismissal of the contract issue, reasoning that professional
persons cannot prevent a patient from reporting the treatment that patient received. Id at
81, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 41.
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moval of their clothes." 98 Dr. Bindrim claimed that he was defamed by
the portrayal of the doctor in the novel, who used obscene and unpro-
fessional language, and by the characterization of his mode of therapy
as one involving bizarre sexual fantasies.99
Plaintiff Paul Bindrim, a young, clean shaven, balding psycholo-
gist with dark brown eyes, was disguised in the novel as Dr. Simon
Herford, a "fat Santa Claus type with long white hair, white sideburns,
a cherubic rosy face and rosy forearms."'" The character, Dr.
Herford, was older than Dr. Bindrim and was a psychiatrist rather than
a psychologist. Although the name, age, physical description, and pro-
fessional degrees were changed in the novel, the court held that "[t]here
is overwhelming evidence that plaintiff and 'Herford' were one." 10' In
reaching its decision, the court relied on tape recordings of the actual
sessions submitted in evidence by Bindrim. The tape recordings of the
sessions which the author attended indicated that "the novel was based
substantially on plaintiff s conduct in the nude marathon."10 2
Bindrim is a case somewhere between the newsworthy and ordi-
nary citizen categories. Bindrim characterized himself as a public per-
sonality, 03 but arguably he was only known within a small
professional circle of doctors in Los Angeles. Although the test of iden-
tification is whether a reasonable person could identify the plaintiff
based on the similarities,' °4 the Bindrirm court noted that certain indi-
viduals did actually identify Bindrim as the character in the novel.'05
Based on the similarity of the method of therapy and the close parallels
between the narrative and the actual therapy, Bindrim recovered.'
0 6
In the most recent case of defamation in fiction, Pring v. Penthouse
International, Ltd, 107 the jury awarded plaintiff $26.5 million on ac-
count of the publication of a short story, "Miss Wyoming Saves the
World... But She Blew the Contest with Her Talent."10 8 The story
98. Id at 69, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 33.
99. Id. at 70-71 & 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 34-35 & 38.
100. Id at 75, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
101. Id at 76, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 38.
102. Id at 75, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 37.
103. Id at 71 n.1, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35 n.1. See infra note 182.
104. See supra notes 32-33 & 46 and accompanying text.
105. Id at 71, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
106. Id at 81, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 41. The court awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages
as a joint and several award against author Mitchell and Doubleday, and $25,000 in punitive
damages against Doubleday.
107. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
108. The story, written by Philip Cioffari, appeared in the August, 1979, issue of Pent-
house magazine. Cioffari, a professor of English at Patterson State College in New Jersey,
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recounts the exploits of Charlene, the 1978 Miss Wyoming, a sexually
promiscuous contestant in the Miss America Pageant. Charlene twirls a
baton for the talent segment of the pageant and fantasizes about her
true talents, which include performing acts of fellatio on her coach.
Pring claimed that the character in the story was modeled on her,
and that she was defamed by her identification with a sexually immoral
character. Pring pointed to the following similarities between Charlene
and herself: Both were baton twirlers from Wyoming who had per-
formed at football games there; both held the title of Miss Wyoming in
1978; and both entered the 1978-79 Miss America Pageant in New
Jersey. 1 9 In the talent segment of the fictional pageant, Charlene
twirled a baton; in the actual contest, plaintiff twirled three batons at
once. In addition, at different points in the story, Charlene is described
as "fuming inside her baby-blue warmup suit," and appearing on stage
in a baby-blue chiffon gown.110 Pring wore a baby-blue and white
warmup suit and a blue chiffon evening gown at the pageant.' 1
Based on the strength of these similarities between plaintiff and
the fictional character, the court held that plaintiff had satisfied the "of
and concerning" test. The court stated that "the similarities in the arti-
cle with her actual fact situations are too many to be coincidental."
'" 2
The court concluded that the question of whether a reader of the article
would understand that the character was actually the plaintiff was a
question for the jury."
3
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding
that Pring satisfied the "of and concerning" test. The court stated that
"the matter of the relationship of the story to the plaintiff as a matter of
identity, is well developed in the record and need not be discussed." 4
attended the finals of the 1978 Miss America Pageant on September 9, 1978. Pring per-
formed on the evening of September 7. Brief for Appellants at 8 In re Pring v. Penthouse
Int'l Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellants].
109. Brief for Appellants at 9.
110. Id
111. Id
112. Order on Motions for Summary Judgment In re Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., No.
C79-351B (D. Wyo. 1981) at 7 [hereinafter cited as Order on Motions].
113. Id at 8. The jury found that Pring and Charlene were one and the same person and
awarded Pring $26.5 million. See infra note 221.
114. The Tenth Circuit in Pring did not discuss what has traditionally been the most
difficult hurdle for plaintiffs seeking redress for defamation in fiction - the "of and con-
cerning" test. See generally Pring, 695 F.2d at 439. See also supra text accompanying notes
40-48. By failing to address the issue of identification, the Tenth Circuit provided no gui-
dance as to the quantity or quality of parallels necessary to satisfy the "of and concerning"
test. Consequently, the significant questions remain unresolved: Had Penthouse merely
changed Charlene's title from Miss Wyoming to Miss New Jersey, or made her a contestant
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This failed disguise category of defamation in fiction case is the
most conceptually troublesome. The plaintiff at once uses the similari-
ties between the character and plaintiff to meet the "of and concern-
ing" test, and the dissimilarities to show defamation. Conversely, the
defendant author or publisher argues that the dissimilarities bear upon
the element of identification and render the plaintiff and character
readily distinguishable. The author argues that his efforts to disguise
the model with dissimilarities vitiate the element of identification, with-
out which there can be no defamation.
To date, under the common law, where an author has consciously
modeled a work of fiction on a newsworthy personality, a princess, I"5 a
psychologist," 6 the subject of a murder trial, 1 7 or a beauty contest-
ant,"" the disguise has failed and the plaintiffs have recovered. By
contrast, in failed disguise cases involving ordinary citizens the courts
have split. Liability in these cases appears to hinge on the scope of an
author's efforts to make the character dissimilar to the model. Appar-
ently, where the model is not involved in some newsworthy event and
some good faith effort is made to disguise the model, the courts are
unprepared to assume that a reader could reasonably identify the char-
acter with the plaintiff. In this situation, the courts are more likely to
give weight to the author's need to write from his own experience.
D. Techniques for Proving and Disproving Liability
Although there is no litmus test for avoiding identification, the
defamation in fiction cases mention five techniques for establishing or
negating liability. These techniques include the following: (1) using a
disclaimer; (2) linking books to films; (3) using a fictional or humorous
context; (4) limiting the role of the character; and (5) making pre-publi-
cation changes.
1. Using a disclaimer
The standard disclaimer, now familiar in books and films: "All
in a year other than 1978, would Pring's case have been dismissed on a motion for summary
judgment? The answer to such questions could have provided valuable assistance to authors
and publishers anxious to avoid defamation litigation.
115. Youssoupoff, 50 T.L.R. 581 (C.A. 1934), see supra notes 80-84 and accompanying
text.
116. Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 29, see supra notes 93-106 and
accompanying text.
117. Brown, 240 A.D. at 520, 270 N.Y.S. at 546, see supra notes 85-87. See also Wheeler,
300 F.2d at 373, supra notes 88-92 and accompanying text.
118. Pring, 694 F.2d at 438. See supra notes 107-14 and accompanying text.
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circumstances in this novel are imaginary, and none of the characters
are in real life,"' 9 has never been sanctioned in any reported decision
as a successful technique to avoid liability. In Youssoupoff v. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd ,12o defendants raised the disclaimer de-
fense for the first time in fiction litigation.' 2 ' The court dismissed the
argument, reasoning that it was "not. . .fitted" to the express state-
ment in the film which represented that a few members of the royal
family were still alive.'2 2 American courts have gone further in their
dismissal of the technique. In Kelly v. Loew's Inc., 123 plaintiff recov-
ered for defamation in the film, "They Were Expendable," based on
the book by the same title. 24 Defendants argued that they were not
liable because the film carried the following disclaimer: "The events,
characters and firms depicted in this photoplay are fictitious. Any simi-
larity to actual persons, living or dead, or to actual firms is purely coin-
cidental."'' 25 The court rejected defendants' argument, observing that
the average person treats such a statement as nothing more than
"tongue-in-the-cheek." 1
26
2. Linking books to films
In those cases of defamation in fiction where a novel has been
adapted into a motion picture, plaintiffs frequently sued the motion
picture producers and distributors, in addition to or instead of, the pub-
lishers and author of the novel. Although the author changed the name
of the model in his novel, and the name was again changed in the mo-
tion picture, the plaintiffs recovered. In the case of film adaptations,
119. Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures, Ltd., 50 T.L.R. 581, 583 (C.A.
1934).
120. Id
121. Id at 583.
122. Id at 583-84.
123. 76 F. Supp. 473 (D. Mass. 1948).
124. They Were Expendable by William L. White, published by Harcourt, Brace and Co.,
is an account of the Motor Torpedo Boat Squadron (popularly called PT boats) in the Phil-
ippines during World War II. The boats were used in actual combat after Pearl Harbor and
ultimately carried General MacArthur and Admiral Rockwell from Cavite to Mindanao.
Plaintiff, then Lt. Kelly, commanded the boat which transported Admiral Rockwell. Id at
475-76.
125. Id at 480.
126. Id at 485. Accord Fetler v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 364 F.2d 650, 653-54 (2d. Cir.
1966) ("[N]o justification for any reliance ... upon the effect of the usual disclaimer that
the book should be read as fiction and that the characters are not biographical but purely
imaginary."). Compare, Smith v. Huntington Publishing Co., 410 F. Supp. 1270, 1273
(1975) (S.D. Ohio 1975) ("no reasonable person could . . . believe that the article, even
excluding the 'fiction' disclaimer, concerned the plaintiff.").
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courts have permitted plaintiffs to rely upon the details in the novel to
supplement the identification between the plaintiff and the character in
the film.' 27 In Youssoupoff v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, I28 Brown v. Para-
mount Publix Corp., '2 9 and Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc. v. Stanley, 3 o
the names of the plaintiffs were changed in the book and changed again
in the film. Nevertheless, the courts in these cases held that a "consider-
able number of reasonable people" could identify the fictional film
characters with their real-life counterparts.
31
3. Using a fictional or humorous context
When the allegedly defamatory work of fiction appears in a short
story, magazine, or collection of short stories, some courts have looked
to a fictional or humorous context to avoid liability on the theory that
the context vitiates the defamatory import of the work. This technique
was first developed in Middlebrooks v. Curtis Publishing Co. 132 In Mid-
dlebrooks, the court emphasized that the short story was listed in the
fiction section of the magazine's index, it was illustrated with
cartoons, 33 and the character's name appeared in a fictional context.'
34
In this case, these countervailing considerations were sufficient to up-
hold the finding against identification.
35
In Dauer & Rttiald; Inc. v. Twenty First Century Communications,
Inc., 136 the defendants were similarly successful with a defense based
on the work's obviously humorous context. In Dauer, a bar and grill
and its proprietor sued National Lampoon for libel based on the coinci-
127. But see Wright v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures, Inc., 55 F. Supp. 639 (D. Mass. 1944). In
Wright, the characters in the film "Primrose Path," based on the book February Hill by
Victoria Lincoln, were not identified with the plaintiff. The court reasoned that the film
changed the names, locations, and causes of death which might have tied the characters in
the film to the characters in the book. The court concluded that the book was used as a mere
source of incident, plot, and characterization, and in such a way that the characters would
not be identified. Id at 640.
128. 50 T.L.R. 581 (C.A. 1934).
129. 240 A.D. 520, 270 N.Y.S. 544 (1934).
130. 192 S.E. 300 (Ga. Ct. App. 1937).
131. The standard generally applied in defamation in fiction cases is "reasonable" identi-
fication. See supra notes 32-33 & 46 and accompanying text.
132. 413 F.2d 141 (4th Cir. 1969).
133. The court reasoned that the story was illustrated by cartoons, and based on the
cartoons, did not depict a real person. Id at 143. However, a cartoon remains subject to the
law of libel if it maliciously presents as fact defamatory material which is false. See Yorty v.
Chandler, 13 Cal. App. 3d 469,472,91 Cal. Rptr. 709,711 (1971). Seesupra note 7 andinfra
note 184 and accompanying text.
134. 413 F.2d at 143.
135. Id
136. 349 N.Y.S.2d 736 (1973).
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dental use of the grill's name, Busy Bee, in a short story.'3 7 The court
relied on the humorous context to deny liability. The court described
the magazine as a "somewhat unconventional, raffish. . . zany journal
of intended humor, developed by racy language and garish photo-
graphs."'13 The court further characterized the story as "besprinkled
with attempted humorisms, puns, chamberings, and fast-paced badi-
nage." ' 39 Viewed in this context of fiction and deliberate humor, the
court held that the short story could not "reasonably be susceptible of a
libelous meaning."' 140
Thus, when an allegedly defamatory work of fiction is published
in a magazine, the courts will evaluate the context as a technique to
avoid liability.'
4 1
4. Limiting the role of the character
The fourth technique suggested by the reported cases to avoid lia-
bility is to categorize the plaintiffs fictional counterpart as a minor
character. In *heeler v. Dell Publishing Co., 142 the court suggested in
dictum that plaintiffs portrayed as minor characters probably will not
be successful in a defamation in fiction suit. The character in Wheeler,
Janice Quill, was described as "inconspicuous" and the court reasoned
that "[n]o average reader. . . would remember the very minor sub-plot
in which [she] had a place."' 43 The suggestion that a plaintiff whose
137. Id at 737. The February issue, "The Humor Magazine," was devoted to "Crime."
The story concerned a plainclothesman named Proctor Silex who searches for a loquacious
rapist and murderer. The story is unresolved, but Silex is seen several times at the "Stop and
Frisk" grog shop. The reader is led to believe that Silex is the rapist. In the photographic
backdrop of the grog shop, the words "Busy Bee" appear. Busy Bee is the name of plaintiff's
bar and grill.
138. Id at 737.
139. Id
140. Id at 738. See also Salomone v. MacMillian Publishing Co., 429 N.Y.S.2d 441
(1980) (Kuperman, J., concurring). In Salornone the court ignored words which would ordi-
narily be deemed defamatory and ruled that the humorous context vitiated the defamatory
character of the words. Id at 443.
141. The defense of a humorous context will not automatically insulate an author and
publisher of fiction from liability. In Triggs v. Sun Printing & Publishing Ass'n, 179 N.Y.
144, 71 N.E. 739 (1904), a defendant newspaper argued that the article was intended to be
understood as humor. The court rejected the argument, stating that "a person shall not be
allowed to murder another's reputation in jest." Id. at 155, 71 N.E. at 743. It may be
observed that the issues that arise with respect to fictional work employing personalities of
real people are remarkably similar to those engendered by attempts at humor. "[B]oth may
lay claim to a crucial role in the communication of ideas, yet both use deliberate misstate-
ment and distortion of the literal truth." See SACK, supra note 7, at 238.
142. 300 F.2d 372 (7th Cir. 1962).
143. Id at 376.
[Vol. 16
DEFAMATION IN FICTION
counterpart is a "minor" character may not be able to state a cause of
action created an issue for future litigation: what constitutes an "incon-
spicuous" or "minor" character? Nevertheless the technique became a
basis for the granting of summary judgment in subsequent cases in-
volving fiction and nonfiction. 144
The minor character suggestion of Wheeler has not been univer-
sally followed. In American Broadcasting - Paramount Theatres, Inc.
v. Simpson, 145 plaintiff sued for defamation in a telecast of the televi-
sion series, "The Untouchables." In the segment, "The Big Train," a
guard is depicted as accepting a bribe and acquiescing in the murder of
another official to procure Al Capone's escape from prison. Plaintiff,
one of a group of sixteen guards who accompanied Capone during the
actual transfer from Atlanta to Alcatraz, claimed that he was identified
as the guard in the episode.146 Although the guard in the telecast was a
composite character, unnamed, who bore no physical resemblance to
plaintiff, the court held that plaintiff was identified by implication. 47
Therefore, although the telecast focused on the main character of Al
Capone and federal agents, a plaintiff portrayed by an arguably minor
character met the "of and concerning" test.
148
5. Making pre-publication changes
The fifth technique for establishing or avoiding liability in defa-
mation in fiction cases relates to pre-publication changes. The courts
have focused on the author's or publisher's efforts to alter the charac-
ter's background, occupation, marital status, or physical appearance [or
their failure to do so, when notified of a plaintiff's claim].
In Fetler v. Houghton Milin Co., 19 the court, troubled by the
painful defamation litigation between brothers, took the unusual occa-
sion to suggest in dictum how liability might be avoided by pre-publi-
cation changes. The court stated that "[a]ll first novels should be
considered suspect. They tend to be autobiographical, and twentieth
144. See Ladany v. William Morrow & Co., 465 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) ("viewed
in the context of the main purpose and subject of the book [the defamatory references] are
incidental and isolated '". Id at 881 (emphasis added). Accord Forsher v. Bugliosi, 26 Cal.
3d 792, 608 P.2d 716, 163 Cal. Rptr. 628 (1980) ("claimed defamatory nature of the book
insofar as it relates to appellant is so obscure and attenuated as to be beyond the realm of
reasonableness.") Id at 805, 608 P.2d at 728, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 635 (emphasis added).
145. 126 S.E.2d 873 (Ga. App. Ct. 1962).
146. Id at 876.
147. Id at 881.
148. Id
149. 364 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1966).
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century fiction is replete with examples of writers whose first novel, at
least, leaned heavily on the author's [usually unflattering] portrayal of
and judgment of his family."' 150 To avoid the obvious identification
between character and plaintiff, the court suggested the exercise of vol-
untary editorial censorship on the part of authors and publishers:
"Frequently merely changing some details . . . might be sufficient to
make identification improbable without at all hurting the literary
values."151
The problem with the technique of pre-publication changes sug-
gested by the Fetler court is, of course, that an author or publisher can
seldom know in advance if changes in age, location, background, or
physical appearance are sufficient to avoid identification with a particu-
lar plaintiff, which is essentially a matter of the degree of similarity.
The court merely concluded that the line between liability and non-
liability would be determined on a case by case basis.
52
Although the courts have suggested five possible techniques to es-
tablish or avoid liability where a plaintiff claims to have been defamed
in a work of fiction, only one of the techniques has met with consistent
success: the technique of linking books to films. By contrast, use of the
disclaimer has been uniformly rejected as a technique to avoid liability.
The remaining three techniques - proof of a fictional or humorous
context, establishment that plaintiffs model is a minor character, and
proof of pre-publication changes - have met with mixed results. The
courts have yet to develop clear standards for liability, and conse-
quently, the various techniques attempted to prove or disprove liability
have met with only fitful success.
III. IMPACT OF NEW YORK TIMES and GER7Z
In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,'53 the Supreme Court looked
to "the central meaning of the First Amendment" and recognized a
policy of "profound national commitment to the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open
. . . ,"15 To implement this policy, the Court constructed an "actual
malice" test.' 55 At the core of this test was the behavioral rationale that
150. Id at 651 n.3.
151. Id at 651-52 n.3 (citing PIPEL & ZAVIN, RIOHTS AND WRITERS: A HANDBOOK OF
LITERARY AND ENTERTAINMENT LAW 23, 25 (1960)).
152. Id at 653.
153. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
154. Id at 270.
155. Malice is a term of art. Constitutional malice, sometimes referred to as "actual mal-
ice," requires a showing that the defendant acted with "knowledge that it was false or with
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it was necessary to formulate a policy of constitutional privilege'56 to
avoid the "chilling effect" on expression protected by the first amend-
ment.157 New York Times and its progeny have made an impact on the
law of defamation in four major areas: (1) the drawing of a distinction
between private persons and public figures, with proof of actual malice
required for public figures to recover from a media defendant;15 (2)
the requirement of fault for a private person to recover compensatory
damages from a media defendant; 59 (3) the requirement of actual mal-
ice for any plaintiff to recover punitive damages from a media defend-
ant;160 and (4) the definition of a broad class of comment or opinion to
which defamation law does not apply.1 61 These four developments
were all in the context of nonfiction.1 62 A number of unexpected, illog-
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id at 279-80. See supra note 11. Com-
mon law malice is defined as ill will, spite, hatred, hostility, a deliberate intention to harm,
or some sinister or corrupt motive. See infra note 195 and accompanying text. Common law
malice is constitutionally insufficient to establish the "actual malice" required to make out a
prima facie libel case. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580(B)(b) (1977). Accord
Old Dominion Branch No. 496, National Ass'n of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264,
281 (1974); Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 10-11 (1970); Cf.
Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) ("Although I joined the
Court's opinion in New York Times, I have come greatly to regret the use in that opinion of
the phrase 'actual malice.' For the fact of the matter is that 'malice' as used in the New York
Times opinion simply does not mean malice as the word is commonly understood. In com-
mon understanding, malice means ill will or hostility, and the most relevant question in
determining whether a person's action was motivated by actual malice is to ask 'why.' As
part of the constitutional standard enunciated in the New York Times case, however, 'actual
malice' has nothing to do with hostility or ill will, and the question 'why' is totally
irrelevant.").
156. In New York Times Justice Brennan honored the commitment to robust debate on
public issues embodied in the first amendment when he stated, "[a] rule compelling the critic
of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions. . . dampens the vigor
and limits the variety of public debate. It is inconsistent with the First and Fourteenth
Amendments." 376 U.S. at 279. This policy, together with the burden of proof standard,
became known as constitutional privilege. Constitutional privilege is a defense to libel. It
affords legal immunity to a newspaper, though the newspaper unintentionally may have
libeled a person, because the law recognizes that in most circumstances, the public interest
requires that an individual's interest in reputation must yield to the greater constitutional
right to report news freely and publicly, even where unintentionally erroneous. See WIN-
FIELD, supra note 40, at 167. One commentator has called the use of the term "constitutional
privilege" a misnomer, arguing that in the law of torts, privileges are affirmative defenses
which the defendant must plead and prove rather than a requirement that plaintiff plead
and prove facts to satisfy the New York Times standard by proof of convincing clarity. See
ELDREDGE, supra note 22, at 293.
157. See TRIBE, supra note 10, at 634.
158. See infra text accompanying notes 163-93.
159. See infra text accompanying notes 194-98.
160. See infra text accompanying notes 199-239.
161. See infra text accompanying notes 240-67.
162. See infra note 201.
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ical consequences have arisen by the application of these concepts to
fiction.
A. Distinguishing Between Private Persons and Public Figures
In New York Times, the Court abrogated the common law rule of
strict liability' 63 and created a new doctrine of constitutional privilege,
stating: "[w]e hold today that the Constitution delimits a State's power
to award damages for libel in actions brought by public officials against
critics of their official conduct."'" The constitutional privilege pre-
cluded public officials from recovering libel judgments against media
defendants unless they were able to prove "actual malice." To prove
actual malice, plaintiffs had to show that the defamatory statement was
made "with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of
whether it was false or not."'' 6 - While the Court did not define the class
of persons falling into the public official category, there followed a se-
ries of decisions extending the reach of New York Times to defamatory
statements about new categories of persons: public figures and private
persons involved in matters of general public interest.
1 61
Ten years after New York Times, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., '
67
the Supreme Court retrenched, narrowing the categories of plaintiffs
who had to prove actual malice. In Gertz the Court sought to strike a
balance between two competing concerns: the state's need to enforce a
legal remedy for defamatory falsehood injurious to the reputation of a
private individual, and the first amendment freedoms of speech and
press.' 68 This accommodation was accomplished by introducing a
"fault" requirement into what previously had been a strict liability
tort.1 69 The Court recognized that its .accommodation of the competing
values would allow states to impose liability on a publisher on a "less
demanding"' 170 showing than that required by New York Times, when
dealing with private persons, but this approach was limited to "com-
163. 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964).
164. Id at 283.
165. Id at 279-80.
166. For a full discussion of the development of the public official private person doctrine
from New York Times through Gertz, see Hill, supra note 3, at 1205. For a discussion of the
recent developments of the doctrine post-Gertz, see Note, Wolston and Hutchinson: Chang-
ing Contours of the Public Figure Test, 13 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 179 (1979).
167. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
168. Id at 348.
169. Id at 347. "We hold that so long as they do not impose liability without fault, the
States may define for themselves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or
broadcaster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private individual." Id
170. Id at 348.
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pensation for actual injury."'171 To recover punitive damages, however,
the Gertz Court required a private person suing a media defendant to
satisfy the New York Times actual malice test.'
7 2
The Gertz language is not absolute in terms of defining the catego-
ries of private persons or public figures. In addressing the standard for
such a determination, the Court set forth a two-tier test. First, there are
"all purpose" public figures, those who "occupy positions of such per-
suasive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all
purposes."'173 Second, there are "limited" public figures, those who
"thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public controversies in
order to influence the resolution of the issues involved.174 In both sit-
uations public figures "invite attention and comment."'175 This distinc-
tion 76 between private person and public figure is crucial because each
classification carries a significantly different standard of proof. Under
Gertz a private person suing a media defendant for compensatory dam-
ages proves "fault,"'17 7 whereas public figures must prove actual mal-
ice.' 78 Both private persons and public figures are required to prove
actual malice to recover punitive damages.'
7 9
The private person/public figure classifications necessitated by
New York Times and Gertz have created an additional, burdensome,
and unpredictable step in the litigation process of suits for defamation.
Prior to reaching the defamation issues, plaintiffs suing media defend-
ants must initially establish whether they are private persons or public
figures. To establish that he or she is a private person, the plaintiff
generally relies on the first two sentences of the Gertz test, arguing that
he does not "occupy a position of persuasive power or influence" nor is
he in the "forefront of public controversies." Simultaneously, the de-
171. Id at 349.
172. Id
173. Id at 345.
174. Id
175. Id One commentator considers the Gertz test "plainly inadequate," and suggests
that the language of the test poses its own problems. See Hill, supra note 3, at 1216 n.56.
176. Until 1980, this determination was for the court. Compare Hotchner v. Castillo-
Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 911 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Because the evidence on this issue is inadequate to
support the jury's verdict, we reverse.... .") with Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court,
106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr. 347 (1980) ("determination of whether plaintiffs' con-
duct made them public figures required the trier of fact to hear and weigh evidence."). Id at
651, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
177. See infra text accompanying notes 194-97.
178. See infra note 199 and accompanying text.
179. 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). "[WMe hold that the states may not permit recovery of
presumed or punitive damages, at least when liability is not based on a showing of knowl-
edge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth."
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fense looks to the summation sentence of the test and asserts that the
plaintiff "invited attention and comment." Typically, the defense cata-
logs examples of the publicity sought and achieved by the plaintiff.
This approach, recently dubbed the "shoe-boxful method of proof,"'80
has led to a dilemma when applied to the classification of a plaintiff as
public or private in a suit for defamation in fiction. If the defense
claims that the story in question is a work of creative imagination, i e.,
fiction or fantasy, in which none of the characters is real or has a living
counterpart, then it seems inconsistent to argue in the alternative that
there is a living counterpart to the character who is a public figure.
In the first case of defamation in fiction tried under the New York
Times-Gertz standards, Bindrim v. Mitchell,"" the plaintiff conceded
that he was a public figure.18 2 However, in the next post-Gertz case
involving fiction, Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd, 83 the dilemma was
manifest. In its motion for summary judgment in Pring, Penthouse ar-
gued that Pring was a public figure who could not prove actual malice
by clear and convincing evidence.' 8 4 Penthouse argued that Pring had
sought publicity for many years, "invited attention," and "voluntarily
180. See Rancho La Costa, Inc. v. Superior Court, 106 Cal. App. 3d 646, 165 Cal. Rptr.
351 (1980) ("in proving that plaintiff in a libel action is a public figure, it is not enough
simply to present evidence of much publicity."). Id at 661, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 357.
181. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 29.
182. Id at 71 n.l, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35 n.l. Arguably, Bindrim need not have conceded
that he was a public figure necessitating the greater burden of proof. Known only to the Los
Angeles medical community, he might have argued that he was a private person because he
had not assumed an influential role in ordering society. Id
183. 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
184. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment on
Ground of Public Figure In re Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Defendants' Public Figure Memorandum]. Penthouse moved for sum-
mary judgment on the additional ground that the story was entitled to constitutional protec-
tion as a form of art and entertainment, and that it should be protected "regardless of its
literary merit or value." Id at 20. Penthouse reasoned that the magazine was entitled to the
same protection as Time, Newsweek or the Smithsonian magazines. "The sexual nature of
the Penthouse article and whatever social value it represents as a form of art or entertain-
ment should not interfere with the legal determination, compelled by principles of free ex-
pression, that the work as fiction is entitled to constitutional protection." Id at 15-16.
Defendants pointed out that the story was listed in the table of contents as "humor," bore
the customary legend on the table of contents page, and was illustrated by a cartoon. Id at
3. These arguments have been rejected by other courts. See supra notes 126 & 133 and
accompanying text. Defendants asked the court to recognize that the similarities between
the character and the plaintiff were "unintended coincidence," and that an unintended coin-
cidence should not entitle Miss Wyoming to recover millions of dollars. Id at 12. The court
denied the motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the story was not labeled fiction
and that the similarities in the article and real life were too many to be coincidental. Order
on Motions at 8.
DEFA/MA TION IN FICTION
thrust" herself before the public. 8 5 Penthouse cataloged Pring's efforts
to gain publicity and examples of the media attention she received.1
86
Penthouse and Pring each asserted that the other was in a logical
quandary. Penthouse urged that Pring could not simultaneously seek
publicity and claim to be a private person. 18 7 Pring retorted that Pent-
house could not simultaneously claim that the article was "purely im-
aginary" yet assert that Pring was a public figure of national repute.
"[C]ould there ever be any public figure," Pring argued, "when the po-
sition of the defense is that there were no realpeople at all in the article
it was 'alljustf iction. ,,88
While Penthouse argued that publicity seekers cannot remain pri-
vate persons, and Pring responded that fictional characters cannot be
public figures, the federal district court ignored the fiction dimension of
the arguments and ruled that Pring was not a public figure.' 89 The
court reasoned that former beauty contestants fade into private life, do
not assume an influential role in ordering society, and do not occupy
positions of persuasive power and influence. In addition, the court rea-
soned that Pring had not drawn herself into any particular public con-
troversy so as to become a limited public figure.'90
Although Pring's status as a public figure or private person was
contested before the district court' 9 ' and the court of appeals, 192 the
Tenth Circuit decision is notably silent on the issue of classification. 93
A suit for defamation in fiction, therefore, like any other defama-
185. Defendants' Public Figure Memorandum at 9.
186. Id at 1-6. Pring had entered numerous beauty contests, including the Miss Universe
and Miss USA Pageants. She reigned as Miss Wyoming from 1978-79. She was the 1978-79
Grand National Twirling Champion, appeared on the cover of Gente magazine, won the
1975 Wyoming baton twirling championship, placed fourth in the National Twirling cham-
pionship, and was runner-up in the Miss Majorette of America contest. Her photograph
appeared on the covers of Drum Major and Twirl magazines.
187. Id. at 9.
188. Letter from plaintiff's counsel to Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, Judge United
States District Court, District of Wyoming, July 31, 1980, In re Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd.,
695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
189. Order on Motions at 7.
190. Id at 6-7.
191. See Defendants' Public Figure Memorandum at 1-20.
192. See Brief for Appellants at 42-4, In re Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438
(10th Cir. 1982) [hereinafter cited as Brief for Appellants].
193. Since Pring was the first defamation in fiction case in which the plaintiff's status as a
public or private person was contested (cf Bindrim, supra text accompanying notes 181-82),
it is unfortunate that the Tenth Circuit did not discuss the district court's determination that
Pring was a private person. By its silence on this issue, the decision fails to suggest guide-
lines for future defamation in fiction cases in which the status of the plaintiff will necessitate
classification.
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tion action, necessitates an initial determination of the plaintiff's status
as public or private. Although the fiction genre seemingly poses an
initial twist of logic - that fictional characters cannot have real public
figure counterparts - the determination of the plaintiff's status will be
made by an analysis of the plaintiffs position in society. At this stage
of the proceedings, the court will not link the character to the plaintiff.
To link the character to the plaintiff would create the potentially falla-
cious argument that private persons portrayed as public figure charac-
ters have become public figures by identification, and conversely that
public figures portrayed by private characters have lost their
prominence.
B. The Elusive Requirement of Proof of Fault
Under Gertz private persons suing a media defendant must prove
"fault" to recover compensatory damages; however, the elements of
proof of fault vary from state to state.' 94 Some states rely on a negli-
gence standard, while others require the plaintiff to prove common law
malice.' 95 Still others require a defendant to show that the matter was
published with "good motives or justifiable ends." 96 Pring went to trial
in Wyoming under a unique common law rule which shifted the bur-
den to Penthouse to show the good motives or justifiable ends of a
farcical short story describing acts of fellatio at the Miss America Pag-
eant. Whether Penthouse or any other publisher of fiction describing
explicit sexual fantasies could make such a showing is doubtful.
Penthouse might have challenged the Wyoming common law rule
on the ground that it placed an affirmative burden of proof on a de-
fendant in contravention of the policies underlying Gertz. The Gertz
formula, "no liability without fault,"' 197 was developed to ensure that a
private plaintiff seeking damages from a media defendant carried the
burden of proof.'98 While Gertz did not specifically address the consti-
tutionality of a state common law rule which imposes an affirmative
burden upon a media defendant, the Court sought to shield the media
from strict liability and did not intend to increase a defendant's burden.
Thus, it is arguable that the Wyoming fault standard undermines the
194. See generally SACK, supra note 7, at 250-55.
195. Sixteen states have adopted the negligence standard, while six others have adopted
variations of "actual malice." New York has applied a standard adapted from Curtis Pub-
lishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967). See SACK, supra note 7, at 250-60.
196. See R. PHELPS, LIBEL 255 (1978).
197. 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
198. id at 348-49.
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policy of Gertz, which favors free expression absent fault on the part of
the media defendant.
C. Actual Malice in Fiction
If a plaintiff seeks punitive damages from a media defendant, the
plaintiff must prove actual malice. 99 The actual malice test has two
prongs, which necessitate a showing of "falsity." When applied to
fiction, the application of a "falsity" test creates a quandary. As one
commentator stated, "[s]ince by the nature of the work the statements
are known to be 'false,' the 'actual malice' standard seems necessarily
to be met.' '2°
The first case to apply the actual malice standard to a work of
fiction was Bindrim v. Mitchell.201 In Bindrim a doctor recovered
$50,000 in compensatory damages from an author who described nude
therapy as vulgar and abusive. 2 In upholding the compensatory dam-
age award, the Bindrim court reasoned that author Mitchell's reckless
disregard for the truth was apparent from her knowledge of what tran-
spired at the therapy sessions. Since she had attended the sessions for
two months prior to writing the novel, the court reasoned that "there
can be no suggestion that she did not know the true facts." ' 3 The
court did not hold that Mitchell would be liable for any novel written
about a practitioner of nude therapy. However, since she was aware of
the actual character of the therapy Bindrim practiced, the court rea-
soned that she could not depict him in a manner which would injure
his professional reputation. 204 As the concurring opinion observed:
"Had the defendant author ... limited her novel to a truthful or
fictional description of the techniques employed in nude encounter
therapy, I would agree ...that plaintiff had no cause of action for
defamation." '
The Bindrim court reasoned that when an author deliberately de-
fames a person through the use of a fictional counterpart, the author is
199. Id See supra note 179.
200. SACK, supra note 7, at 243 n.290.
201. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 61, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 29. It was fourteen years before the New
York Times standards were applied to fiction. Id. at 74, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 36-37. See supra
text accompanying notes 93-106 for discussion of the "of and concerning" test in Bindrim.
202. Id at 81, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 41. The court awarded $50,000 in compensatory damages
as a joint and several award against author Mitchell and Doubleday, the publisher;, and
$25,000 in punitive damages against Doubleday.
203. Id at 73, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
204. Id at 80, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 40. Three doctors testified that they could recognize
Bindrim as Herford because Bindrim had written about "peak experiences."
205. Id at 83, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 41 (Jefferson, J., concurring).
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guilty of actual malice.2 °6 Mitchell's mischaracterization of Dr. Bin-
drim's therapy could not be protected by the first amendment because
the author knew that her depiction of Bindrim's therapy was false and
"[t]he first amendment right to comment does not include the right to
commit libel.""2 7 When an author knows that she is creating a "devas-
tating portrait '20 8 - a depiction which is both false and injurious of
reputation - constitutional malice exists.
The confusion wrought by the Bindrim decision stems from Justice
Files' dissenting opinion. The dissent suggested that the analytical
problem with the majority opinion was that "it brands a novel as
libelous because it is 'false,' Le., fiction; and infers 'actual malice' from
the fact that the author and publisher knew it was not a true represen-
tation of plaintiff. '20 9 This view is based on the following syllogism:
(a) a work of fiction is a work of imagination which is not intended to
be literally true; (b) an author who knows the falsity of her writing is
guilty of actual malice; (c) all writers of fiction are guilty of actual mal-
ice.210 If Bindrim stands for this proposition, as the dissent believed,
and correctly states the law, then all authors and publishers face puni-
tive damage awards upon proof of defamatory words and proof that
they are "of and concerning" the plaintiff, without more. The more
loudly the publisher and author protest that the work is "fictional," the
more they affirm that they have acted maliciously. 21' Gertz permits an
award of punitive damages where the actual malice standard is satis-
fied. 2  Consequently, if fiction satisfies the malice standard by tauto-
logical reasoning, then punitive damages follow automatically.
This application of the New York Times actual malice and Gertz
punitive damages standards is based on a misreading of Bindrim and is
illogical in any event. Bindrim held that an author who uses a work of
purported fiction to cloak an intentionally deceptive and injurious de-
piction of a plaintiff is liable for punitive damages.21 3 The majority's
206. Id at 72, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35.
207. Id at 84, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 42 (concurring opinion). A court will "refuse to permit a
writer and publisher to libel a person and hide under the banner of having written only
fictional material." Id
208. Id at 69, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 34.
209. Id at 89, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 45 (Files, P.J., dissenting).
210. Hereinafter cited as Bindrim syllogism.
211. "In a case of fiction, the [New York Times] standard must be cast in different terms.
Otherwise, publishers of fiction, who by definition know of its literal falsity, will be strictly
liable, even if they have no reason to believe that their publication would be understood as
depicting language and conduct by any real person." Brief for Appellants at 30.
212. See supra note 179.
213. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 84, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 42.
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conclusion that the author was liable for damages did not flow auto-
matically from proof that the work was fictional. It was based, rather,
upon a finding of subjective intent to injure the plaintiff.
1. "Falsity" creates strict liability
The Bindrim decision served as persuasive precedent in Pring, 11
4
illustrating the danger lurking behind the formulation set forth by the
dissent in Bindrim. Pring, a non-public figure, was required to satisfy
the New York Times actual malice standard to recover punitive dam-
ages.21 ' The plaintiff relied on the Bindrim dissent's syllogism and ar-
gued: "How can a magazine [publisher] believe that an article was
obviously fictional and obviously incredible, and still contend that it
did not know it was false? If they claim it was fiction, then they cannot
say that they thought it was true."'21 6 In fact, Penthouse never claimed
that the story was true. To the contrary, the magazine contended that
"the inherent improbability of the story and the physical impossibility
of some of the sexual feats described, lead to a single inevitable conclu-
sion - the article is pure fiction. Could a reasonable person ever be-
lieve that the events related were true? Of course not."
217
The argument that the article was "pure fiction" missed the mark.
Pring had argued to the jury that if Penthouse knew that the story was
"not true," then it was false, permitting her a recovery of punitive dam-
ages. To a reasonable juror no other conclusion was possible, because
no other alternative had been presented. Penthouse should have at-
tacked the Bindrim syllogism as imposing a false dichotomy. The
"knowledge of the falsity" test was developed by the Supreme Court to
protect news media defendants who are, of course, expected to print the
truth.218 A reader of a newspaper expects that what he is reading is
"true." Thus, set in this context the dichotomy is appropriate. Readers
of novels or short stories, on the other hand, expect that what they read
is creative fiction. Therefore, to the extent that a publisher has printed
fiction, it has published neither "falsity" nor "truth" in the sense these
214. See Letter from plaintiff's counsel to Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, Judge,
United States District Court, District of Wyoming, October 28, 1980, In re Pring v. Pent-
house Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
215. See supra text accompanying note 199.
216. Letter from plaintiff's counsel to Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, Judge, United
States District Court, District of Wyoming, October 28, 1980, In re Pring v. Penthouse Int'l,
Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
217. Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment at 5.
218. One commentator argues that works of fiction should be absolutely immune from
libel suits. See Note, Defamation in Fiction The Casefor Absolute First Amendment Protec-
tion, 29 AM. U.L. REv. 571, 578-88 (1980).
1983]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
terms were used in New York Times. 219
Unfortunately, the Pring case went to the jury on instructions de-
rived from New York Times, without modifications appropriate to
fiction. The jury was asked to determine whether (1) Penthouse had
knowledge of the falsity of the published information; or (2) Penthouse
published the article with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.220 This emphasis on "falsity" led to the inevitable conclusion that
since Penthouse itself admitted that Pring did not commit fellatio at the
pageant, the magazine published with knowledge of the falsity. Pring
had proved her case, and was awarded $25 million in punitive
damages.221
2. Reckless disregard may mitigate damages
The New York Times "reckless disregard" standard for the proof
of constitutional malice was defined in St. 4mant v. Thompson.222 In St.
.4mant, the Court stated that "reckless conduct is not measured by
whether a reasonably prudent man would have published, or would
have investigated before publishing. There must be sufficient evidence
to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained serious
doubts as to the truth of his publication.
'223
In Bindrim, the publisher was not liable for the original hardback
edition of the novel Touching. Doubleday was held liable for the sub-
sequent paperback edition.224 The court observed that Doubleday had
published the hardback edition with assurances from the author that
"no actual, identifiable person was involved and that all the characters
were fictitious .... ,,225 Although courts have required that publishers
investigate the truth or falsity of authors' statements, this duty is im-
posed on "factual stories about actual people. ' 226 The Bindrim court
219. See Spahn v. Julian Messner, Inc., 21 N.Y.2d 124, 131, 233 N.E.2d 840, 845, 286
N.Y.S.2d 832, 838 (1967) (Bergan, J., dissenting) ("Fiction is the conscious antithesis of
truth.").
220. Letter from plaintiff's counsel to Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, Judge, United
States District Court, District of Wyoming, October 28, 1980, In re Pring v. Penthouse Int'l,
Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
221. Judgment was entered as follows: Actual Damages: Cioffari, $10,000; Penthouse,
$1,500,000. Punitive Damages: Cioffari, $25,000; Penthouse, $25,000,000. See Brief for Ap-
pellants at 6. The court conditioned its denial of a new trial upon a remittur of the punitive
damage award against Penthouse in the sum of $12,500,000. Id at 7.
222. 390 U.S. 727 (1968).
223. Id at 731 (emphasis added). Accord Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 335
n.6 (1974).
224. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 74, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
225. Id at 73, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
226. Id
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reasoned that in the case of fiction, where there is nothing to suggest
inaccuracy, Doubleday could not have "entertained serious doubts as
to the truth or falsity of the [hardback] publication."227 The court
therefore extended to a work of fiction the rule that investigatory fail-
ure alone is insufficient to find actual malice.228
Prior to the paperback edition, however, Bindrim's attorney noti-
fied Doubleday by letter that the character in Touching, Dr. Herford,
was a defamatory portrayal of Dr. Bindrim. This letter constituted no-
tice to Doubleday that it faced possible defamation litigation,' and the
publisher could no longer rely on Mitchell's assurances.229 At this
point, Doubleday either had or should have had serious doubts as to
the possibility that plaintiff was defamed in Touching230 but published
anyway. Accordingly, Doubleday was found liable for punitive dam-
ages for the subsequent paperback edition.
The logic of the Bindrim court with respect to "reckless disregard"
might have been applied to Pring. The story was a fantasy written by
an English professor who had previously published four stories and
several film reviews in Penthouse. The story was submitted to Pent-
house by the author's New York agent and ultimately was purchased
227. Id at 74, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
228. Investigatory failure will not establish constitutional malice under the New York
Times "reckless disregard" standard. In New York Times, the Court reasoned that the
Times was not negligent for its failure to check the accuracy of the advertisement against its
own files. The Court reasoned that the Times relied upon knowledge of the good reputation
of many of those whose names were listed as sponsors in the advertisement, and upon a
letter from A. Phillip Randolph, who was known to the Times as a responsible individual.
Randolph certified that the use of the names listed in the advertisement was authorized. 376
U.S. at 287 (emphasis added). This reliance upon a "known responsible individual" has
become a factor to ameliorate "reckless disregard." See Baldine v. Sharon Herald Co., 391
F.2d 703, 707 (3d Cir. 1968); Rosanova v. Playboy Enterprises Inc., 411 F. Supp. 440, 448
(S.D. Ga. 1976). This reliance standard has been applied to investigatory failure in books as
well as newspapers. See Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 73, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 39; Hotchner v.
Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977); Rinaldi v. Holt, Rinehart & Winston, Inc., 42
N.Y.2d 369, 366 N.E.2d 1299, 397 N.Y.S.2d 943 (1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977).
229. Since Mitchell had previously published a novel, she was "known" to Doubleday as
a reliable source. The court found it reasonable for Doubleday to "rely" on Mitchell's assur-
ances that the characters in her second novel were fictitious until Bindrim's letter, which
acted to put Doubleday on notice that they could no longer rely on Mitchell's assurances. 92
Cal. App. 3d at 74, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 36. The concept of reliance on a known author may
insulate a publisher from damages in the case of a second novel, but it provides no protec-
tion for a publisher of first novels. In the case of first novels, the publishing industry will not
be able to rely on the author's assurances, and new standards will have to be developed.
Publishers will have to concentrate on the element of identification between characters and
potential plaintiffs prior to publication.
230. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 74, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
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pursuant to a written agreement.23 1 "Based upon the author's assur-
ance that the story was fictional, and its preposterous nature," the edi-
tors at Penthouse "deemed no factual investigation was necessary. ' 232
Accordingly, Penthouse could not be said to have entertained serious
doubts as to the truth or falsity of the story because its editors believed
"factual investigation" unwarranted or inappropriate for a fantasy.
233
Under the "reckless disregard" standard, a publisher of fiction should
not be liable for punitive damages if it fails to investigate the possible
defamatory nature of a work of fiction written by a "reliable source."
234
The early case of Corrigan v. Bobbs-Merrill Co. 235 had established
a similar demarcation between publisher and author based on the old
common law malice standard. In that case, the New York Court of
Appeals applied the common law rule of agency and reasoned:
Actual malice might be inferred as against the author from
the falsity of the publication. . . but not as against the mere
publisher of a libel in a novel which on its face does not pur-
port to be serious. . .. The publisher in such a case is not
liable to exemplary damages for the acts of the author upon
mere proof of publication3 6
The Corrigan court did hold, however, that punitive damages may
be imposed against the publisher on a showing that knowledge of the
author's intent to injure was chargeable to the publisher.237 The court
reasoned that such a recovery could be based on proof that an editor
employed by the publishing company knew that the author intended to
injure Corrigan by publication. 38
231. Brief for Appellants at 7-8.
232. Id at 8.
233. Id
234. Id at 38. See supra note 228 and accompanying text. Liability for punitive damages
under the reckless disregard test must be distinguished from liability for compensatory dam-
ages under the fault standard. It would not be inconsistent for an author or publisher to be
found liable for compensatory damages without being found liable for punitive damages.
Compare supra notes 222-39 and accompanying text with infra notes 335-43 and accompany-
ing text.
235. 228 N.Y. 58, 126 N.E. 260 (1920). See supra notes 34-39 for discussion of strict
liability and supra notes 49-53 for discussion of the "of and concerning" test in Corrigan.
236. Id at 66, 126 N.E. at 263.
237. Id at 68, 126 N.E. at 264.
238. Id at 69, 126 N.E. at 264. Testimony indicated that an editor, Bernhardt, was inti-
mately connected with author Howard. Bernhardt aided Howard on the manuscript and
galley proofs at Howard's home on weekends. Witnesses testified that Bernhardt "knew"
Howard had sought to "get even with Corrigan. . . but was willing to take a chance on the
book for the sake of the publicity that might result." Id at 68, 126 N.E. at 264. The court
was not convinced that Bernhardt's acts in connection with Howard were within the scope of
his employment, and the court remanded for a new trial on that issue.
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This ruling concerning agency law is relevant to defining the scope
of a publisher's exposure to punitive damages. To the extent authors
are independent contractors239 whose manuscripts reach publishers
through independent agents, the publisher should not be charged with
knowledge of the possible false depiction contained in a novel. Where,
however, an editor employed by the publisher interacts with the author
in revising and editing the work, a basis may exist for imputing the
author's intent to the publisher.
D. Fact/Opinion Syllogism for Fiction
Just as the New York Times actual malice test has given rise to a
plaintiff's argument that publishers of fiction are necessarily liable,24°
the Gertz decision has given rise to a defendant's argument that pub-
lishers of fiction can never be liable. Based on Gertz, defendants have
asserted that an idea is either a fact or an opinion.241 Since fiction is by
definition "not factual," defendants contend it is entitled to absolute
protection as privileged opinion.2 42
At common law both statements of fact 243 and opinion244 could
form the basis of a defamation suit. The words were presumed false
and actionable unless the defendant proved them true.245 Determining
whether an allegedly defamatory communication was a fact or opinion
was difficult, but crucial, because at common law statements of opinion
gave rise to the "fair comment" privilege.246
The Supreme Court in New York Times constitutionalized the
common law fair comment privilege. 247 The Court held that as a mat-
ter of constitutional law, commentary about public officials is protected
even if the factual assertions upon which it is based are false, provided
there is no showing that these factual assertions were made with actual
239. For an application of a defense for liability based upon the theory of a writer's act-
ing as an independent contractor, see Belli v. Curtis Publishing Co., 25 Cal. App. 3d 384, 102
Cal. Rptr. 122 (1972).
240. See supra notes 214-21 and accompanying text.
241. Brief for Appellants at 13.
242. Id
243. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 565.(1977).
244. Id at § 566.
245. Id at § 581A comment b.
246. See PROSSER, supra note 41, at 812-15. The common law privilege of fair comment
was developed to protect statements of opinion regarding matters of public concern. At
common law, the privilege, which became a qualified defense, was limited to opinion and
did not extend to any false assertion of fact. This led to a most unsatisfactory and unreliable
need to distinguish between opinions and facts.
247. See supra notes 153-57 for discussion of the New York Times abrogation of strict
liability.
19831
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
malice.24 8 Ten years later, however, the Gertz decision may have sub-
sumed the defense of fair comment under the broader defense that all
opinion is privileged.2 49 In effect, Gertz held that comment need no
longer be "fair," provided it was comment. The Court stated: "[u]nder
the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on
the conscience of judges and juries, but on the competition of other
ideas."25
This sweeping pronouncement, which suggests that an idea is sy-
nonymous with an opinion, posits that an opinion can neither be true
nor false.25' Since the law of defamation only permits recovery for
statements proved false, it would appear that an opinion can no longer
give rise to a successful defamation action.
252
In the companion case to Gertz, Old Dominion Branch No. 496,
NationalAssn. ofLetter Carriers v. Austin,25 3 the Court similarly stated
that even in a labor dispute, "[t]he sine qua non of recovery for defama-
tion . .. is the existence of falsehood . . . . [T]he most repulsive
speech enjoys immunity provided it falls short of a deliberate or reck-
less untruth ... 254 Citing Gertz, the Court further stated that
"[b]efore the test of reckless or knowing falsity can be met, there must
be a false statement of fact. 255 Based on this reading of Gertz and
Letter Carriers, the courts treated statements of opinion as constitution-
ally protected and imposed civil liability for false statements of fact. 56
In Good Government Group of Seal Beach, Inc., v. Superior
Court,257 the California Supreme Court recognized that the distinction
248. 376 U.S. 254,279-80 (1964). The Alabama statute invalidated by the Supreme Court
in New York Times had limited the fair comment privilege to opinions based on true state-
ments of fact. Id at 267. The Court held that the first amendment warranted an extension
of the doctrine of fair comment to include misstatements of underlying facts as long as they
were not made with knowledge that they were false or with reckless disregard for the truth.
Id at 279-80.
249. See infra note 252.
250. 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974). Accord Brief for Appellants at 13.
251. 418 U.S. at 339-40.
252. See SACK, supra note 7, at 164. "The common law 'fair comment' privilege, [is] now
arguablLy] obsolete as a result of developments in constitutional doctrine. . ....
253. 418 U.S. 264 (1974). See infra text accompanying notes 279-94 for a discussion of
this case in the context of literal defamation.
254. Id at 283-84.
255. Id at 284.
256. See Gregory v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 596, 601, 552 P,2d 425, 428,
131 Cal. Rptr. 641, 644 (1976). This determination between fact and opinion was a question
of law. Id at 601, 552 P.2d at 488, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 644.
257. 22 Cal. 3d 672, 586 P.2d 572, 150 Cal. Rptr. 258 (1978).
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between fact and opinion is not easily drawn. The court stated that
"[a]n allegedly defamatory statement may constitute a fact in one con-
text but an opinion in another, depending upon the nature and content
of the communication taken as a whole."" s The court concluded that
when an article is ambiguous, "it is for the jury to determine whether
an ordinary reader would have understood the article as a factual as-
sertion. . . or whether the statements were generally understood as an
opinion." 2 9
The dichotomy of fact or opinion has created a second illogical
syllogism when applied to defamation in fiction: (1) defamation is a
false statement of fact which causes injury; (2) neither opinions nor
fiction involve statements of fact; (3) neither opinions nor fiction may
give rise to a cause of action for defamation.26 ° Since fiction is not a
statement of "fact," one can argue that it is a protected form of speech
and therefore outside the ambit of the libel laws.261
In Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd, Penthouse argued the opinion syl-
logism on appeal before the Tenth Circuit.262 Penthouse contended
that the offending portions of the story [ie., levitation during fellatio]
were factually impossible, and concluded that the story contained no
false statement of fact.263 Because the acts described were not "fac-
tual," Penthouse argued, the story was an expression of opinion and
therefore not actionable.2  Indeed, the syllogism can be applied to all
works of fiction: since fiction is by definition not "factual," it is argua-
bly an expression of opinion and therefore does not give rise to any
claim.
The difficulty with this argument, like the argument that fiction is
knowing falsehood,265 is that it is based on a false dichotomy. Works of
fiction, by definition, are neither fact nor opinion; they are imaginative
narration.266 It is possible for a work of fiction to be defamatory if (1)
258. Id at 680, 586 P.2d at 575, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 261.
259. Id at 682, 586 P.2d at 576, 150 Cal. Rptr. at 262.
260. Hereinafter cited as Gertz syllogism.
261. See Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 913 (2d Cir. 1977) ("An assertion that
cannot be proved false cannot be held libellous."), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977). For a
criticism of this view see Hill, supra note 3, at 1239.
262. See generally Brief for Appellants at 10-19.
263. See id at 14-15.
264. Id at 14-19.
265. See supra notes 209-13 and accompanying text.
266. Cf. Landau v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. Inc., 128 N.Y.S.2d 254,257 (1954) ("[Fic-
tion is] '[t]he species of literature which is concerned with the narration of imaginary events
and the portraiture of imaginary characters .... ' ") (quoting NEw ENGLISH DICTMONARY
187 (1901)).
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the author cloaks a misrepresentation of fact in the mantle of creative
expression, as the court found in Bindrim ;267 or (2) a work of evident
imagination mischaracterizes and misrepresents a person's character so
as to injure his or her reputation. Defamation in fiction, then, is broad
enough to include narrative misrepresentation and narration which im-
pliedly impugns the character and injures reputation.
E. Literal and Inferential Defamation
Under the common law, a plaintiff could be defamed by the literal
meaning of words or by an inference suggested by the words, 268 and a
defendant sued for defamation could be found "liable for what [was]
insinuated, as well as for what [was] stated explicitly." 269 When a plain-
tiff claimed to have been defamed either by the literal or inferential use
of language, the common law required a court to determine, as a matter
of law, the sufficiency of such language to state a cause of action.270 In
making this decision, a court applied a reasonable reader test,27' and
"determined the sense or meaning of the language of the complaint for
libelous publication ... 272 Subsequent to Gertz, courts making a
determination of the sufficiency of language to state a cause of action
must additionally determine as a matter of law whether the allegedly
defamatory language contains or implies a false statement of fact.273
These two determinations, sufficiency and false statement of fact,
which require an analysis of the allegedly defamatory language in its
literal or inferential context, proved fatal to Pring on appeal before the
Tenth Circuit. Prior to trial at the district court level, Pring amended
her complaint to limit her cause of action to "literal defamation" 274 and
thereby forestalled what plaintiff characterized as "a wide-open assault
on all areas of her privacy - areas that were not raised by the arti-
cle."27 5 Although Penthouse opposed plaintiffs election to amend, 276 it
was this tactical procedural move which ultimately led to a reversal of
267. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
268. See SACK, supra note 7, at 50. Accord MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal.
2d 536, 547, 343 P.2d 36, 41 (1959). See infra note 327.
269. MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co., 52 Cal. 2d 536, 547, 343 P.2d 36, 41 (1959).
270. Id at 547, 343 P.2d at 41. Cf. Letter Carriers, 418 U.S. at 264 ("The Court has often
recognized that in cases involving free expression we have the obligation, not only to formu-
late principles capable of general application, but also to review the facts to insure that the
speech involved is not protected under federal law.").
271. Id
272. Id
273. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40. See supra notes 250-52 and accompanying text.
274. See infra text accompanying notes 300-03.
275. Letter from plaintif's counsel to Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, Judge, United
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the jury award by the Tenth Circuit.2 7
Confronted by the application of libel to a work of fiction, an issue
which had never been addressed at the federal appellate level, the
Tenth Circuit relied upon two Supreme Court decisions: Greenbelt Co-
operative Publishing Ass'n v. Bresler, 278 and Old Dominion Branch No.
496, National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin.279 Both deci-
sions, although decided in a nonfiction context, addressed the issues of
literally defamatory words used as exaggerated figures of speech.
In Greenbelt, a newspaper carried reports of tumultuous city coun-
cil meetings at which Bresler, a land developer, conditioned his sale of
land to the city for use as a school upon receiving certain zoning con-
cessions on his other parcels of land.280 The newspaper reports charac-
terized Bresler's negotiating position as "blackmail," and the word
appeared several times in the articles.28'
The Court analyzed the literal and figurative use of the term
"blackmail" and suggested that reasonable readers would ignore the
literal meaning of that word and look to the context to see that it was
used as obvious and intentional exaggeration. The Court stated:
No reader could have thought that either the speakers at the
meetings or the newspaper articles reporting their words were
charging Bresler with the commission of a criminal offense.
On the contrary, even the most careless reader must have per-
ceived that the word was no more than rhetorical hyperbole, a
vigorous epithet used by those who considered Bresler's nego-
tiating position extremely unreasonable.282
Concluding that no reader reasonably could have understood that
Bresler was charged with the crime of blackmail, 283 and that the words
in context were a mere exaggerated figure of speech, the Court held
"that the imposition of liability on such a basis was constitutionally
impermissible - that as a matter of constitutional law, the word
'blackmail' in these circumstances was not. . . libel."
28 4
States District Court, District of Wyoming, October 28, 1980, In re Pring v. Penthouse Int'l,
Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
276. Id
277. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l. Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
278. 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
279. 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
280. 398 U.S. at 7.
281. Id at 7-8.
282. Id at 14.
283. Id
284. Id at 13.
1983]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW
In Letter Carriers, the Supreme Court addressed the "extent to
which state libel laws may be applied. . in the course of labor dis-
putes, 2 85 and in so doing, the Court again distinguished between lit-
eral language and the meaning of that language in a figurative context.
In Letter Carriers, a union newsletter repeatedly listed the plaintiff's
name under the heading "List of Scabs."2 86 The Court noted that the
allegedly defamatory epithet "scab" was "literally and factually
true, '2 87 while references in the same newsletter to Jack London's defi-
nition of a "scab" as one who "is a traitor to his God, his country, his
family and his class,"2 could not be construed as a representation of
fact about the plaintiff.2 89 Relying on the logic of Greenbelt, the Court
stated:
It is similarly impossible to believe that any reader of the Car-
rier's Comer would have understood the newsletter to be
charging the appellees with committing the criminal offense
of treason. As in Bresler, Jack London's 'definition of a scab'
is merely rhetorical hyperbole, a lusty and imaginative ex-
pression ... 290
The Court reasoned that the use of the definition of "scab" was a
familiar piece of union literature amounting to mere hyperbole, and no
inference of a crime of treason could be drawn from the term.29'
Therefore, by distinguishing between the literal use of "scab" and the
hyperbolic charge of treason, the Court suggested that liability could be
based upon the former but not upon the latter.292 In Letter Carriers,
the Court concluded that since the term "scab" was not "used in such a
way as to convey a false representation of fact, '2 93 and no false "factual
representation [could] reasonably be inferred," 94 the publication was
protected.
When Greenbelt and Letter Carriers are viewed as cases involving
literally defamatory words which are rendered non-actionable by their
use as rhetorical hyperbole, it is apparent why they were relied on in
Pring. On appeal in Pring the Tenth Circuit relied on these cases to
285. 418 U.S. at 279.
286. Id at 267.
287. Id at 283.
288. Id at 268.
289. Id at 284.
290. Id at 285-86.






reverse the district court, holding as a matter of law that the story,
"Miss Wyoming Saves the World" was "rhetorical hyperbole" pro-
tected by the first amendment.295
In Pring the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed that "First Amendment-def-
amation interaction" necessitates a "false statement of fact. ' 296 "This
factual statement and 'reasonably understood' element," stated the
court, "is described by the Supreme Court as a constitutional require-
ment." '2 97 To satisfy the false statement of fact requirement, the court
reasoned that in the peculiar procedural posture of the Pring case, de-
famatory statements had to be taken literally or not at all.298 However,
literal defamatory statements which could not be taken seriously could
not be held to be defamatory. Based on this analysis, the Tenth Circuit
framed the central issue in Pring as whether "the story [could] reason-
ably be understood to describe actualfacts about the plaintiff . . 299
The Tenth Circuit's imposition of the literal-fact requirement
stemmed from Pring's amended complaint. In her amended complaint,
Pring alleged:
The net effect of the aforementioned article was to create the
impression throughout the United States, Wyoming and the
world that the Plaintiff committed fellatio on one Monty Ap-
plewhite and also upon her coach, Corky Corcoran, in the
presence of a national television audience at the Miss
America Pageant. The article also creates the impression that
Plaintiff committed fellatio like acts upon her baton at the
Miss America contest.
30°
The court reasoned that Pring's complaint, as amended, had the
effect of limiting her cause of action to "descriptions with no general
implications."'30 1 This foreclosure of general implications had conse-
quences for both plaintiff and defendant. Penthouse was denied dis-
covery into Pring's general reputation or sexual history; and Pring
could not rely on a general imputation of immorality,3°2 but was forced
to contend that the particular descriptions in the story were defamatory
factual assertions. 0 3
295. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 443 (10th Cir. 1982).
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Penthouse had sought discovery of Pring's reputation to address
issues of credibility, truth, and mitigation of damages. 3 4 These issues
might have justified inquiry into Pring's prior sexual history. By elimi-
nating "general implications" from the complaint, however, Penthouse
was restricted to discovery concerning the conduct specifically de-
scribed in the article: three instances of levitation during fellatio.
Plaintiff was similarly restricted. While Pring gained the advan-
tage of blocking discovery into her sexual history, she lost the possibil-
ity of proving she was defamed by inference.30 5 By choosing not to rely
on general imputations of immorality, Pring could not claim that the
story implied that she was immoral, promiscuous, unchaste, or even
sexually deviant. Rather, she elected to argue that unlike the character
Charlene, Pring had not committed fellatio on national television. The
consequence of this restriction proved fatal to her claim. The court
characterized the three incidents of levitation during fellatio as "fanci-
ful" rather than "factual. ' 30 6 As fantasy, the court reasoned that the
incidents "provid[ed] a sufficient signal that the story could not be
taken literally, and the portions charged as defamatory could not rea-
sonably be understood as a statement of fact.
3 0 7
In Pring, the Tenth Circuit failed to address the more difficult is-
sues surrounding defamation in fiction. The opinion is narrowly
drafted to address defamation without "general implication." Conse-
quently, the opinion will be of little precedential value to those cases
involving the broader issue of defamation by inference.
IV. AVOIDING AUTOMATIC STRICT LIABILITY AND PUNITIVE
DAMAGES FOR DEFAMATION IN FICTION
What is needed is a fresh analytical framework for determining
liability for defamation in fiction, one which embraces the unique char-
acter of the genre. This section proposes such a framework and the
appropriate standards.
Litigation surrounding defamation in fiction poses three central
problems: (1) the elusive nature of the Gertz fault standard; 08 (2) the
imposition of strict liability under the Bindrim syllogism; 3 9 and (3) the
304. Letter from plaintiff's counsel to Honorable Clarence A. Brimmer, Judge United
States District Court, District of Wyoming, October 28, 1980, In re Pring v. Penthouse Int'l,
Ltd., 695 F.2d 438 (10th Cir. 1982).
305. See infra note 327 and supra notes 268-73 and accompanying text.
306. Pring v. Penthouse Int'l, Ltd., 695 F.2d 438, 441 (10th Cir. 1982).
307. Id at 442.
308. See supra text accompanying notes 194-98.
309. See supra text accompanying notes 214-21.
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automatic exaction of punitive damages under the Bindrim syllo-
gism.3 10 This comment suggests several approaches to solving these
problems with a view that publishers and authors of fiction may be
afforded the same "breathing space"31'I afforded publishers of news and
political commentary.
,4. The Fault Standard Does Not Apply to Fiction
Properly understood, Gertz did not state a rule which is literally
applicable to a work of fiction. The Court observed that different con-
siderations would obtain if a state imposed liability for a "factual mis-
statement whose content did not warn a reasonably prudent editor...
of its defamatory potential. ' 3 2 The Court intimated no view as to the
proper resolution of such a case. Fiction, it is submitted, is such a case.
Accordingly, first amendment protections of speech and expression dic-
tate a different result. That is, to the extent that a work of literature
remains a product of creative imagination, ie., fiction, it does not
"make substantial danger to reputation apparent. ,3 1 3 Since there is no
apparent identifiable plaintiff, a prudent publisher would not be
warned of potential liability.
Fiction, it is posited, exists as an exception to the rule of Gertz.
Carving out exceptions to the Gertz doctrine is not without precedent.
In Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley,314 the Oregon
Supreme Court held that Gertz did not apply to purely private defama-
tion. The court reasoned that Gertz was properly applied in the context
of a private person suing a media defendant, but it was inapplicable in
the case of a private person suing a private person. 5
B. Fault Must Be Definedfor Fiction
Gertz was designed for application to a work of nonfiction.
3 16 If
the basic architecture of Gertz is to be applied to works of fiction, then
310. See supra text accompanying notes 199-213.
311. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964) ("[E]rroneous state-
ment is inevitable in free debate, and that it must be protected if the freedoms of expression
are to have the 'breathing space' that they 'need. . .to survive. "(citations omitted).
312. 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974).
313. Id at 348 (citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967)). Accord
Bindrim, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 73-74, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 35. The Bindrim court suggested that a
work of fiction does not put a publisher on notice that there are inaccuracies which necessi-
tate investigation.
314. 568 P.2d 1359 (Or. 1977).
315. Id at 1365.
316. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B comment e (1977). Accord Harley-
Davidson, 568 P.2d at 1364.
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the standard "no liability without fault" needs to be defined.317 The
states cannot be left to determine on a state-by-state basis the appropri-
ate standard. Such an approach creates the potential for fifty standards
with little predictability for a publisher involved in interstate com-
merce.318 The publishing industry requires greater protection than or-
dinary interstate businesses because it manufactures and ships material
protected by the first amendment. The full protection of first amend-
ment interests requires the development of a nationwide standard de-
fining the rudimentary elements of "fault." Some of the same
considerations which led Justice Powell to condition liability of media
defendants upon a finding of fault319 make it imperative for the
Supreme Court to take the logically anterior step of defining fault.
In defamation actions based on works of fiction, "fault" should
necessitate affirmative proof of four elements of the common law tort
of defamation without benefit of the presumptions. The plaintiff
should also prove culpability as an alternative to the common law mal-
ice standard. That is, the plaintiff would have to prove (1) use of de-
famatory words relating to the plaintiff; (2) publication to third parties;
(3) falsity of facts; (4) culpability; and (5) injury.320
1. Use of defamatory words relating to the plaintiff
Under the common law, the first element of the tort of defamation
was tested by a reasonable reader standard.321 As initially stated in
Hulon & Co. v. Jones,322 the court had to determine whether reason-
able readers would believe the character referred to a real person, and
whether reasonable readers would believe the story referred to the
plaintiff.323 This reasonable reader test was applied only to the first
317. Justice White dissented in Gertz, arguing that the states would have to struggle to
discern the meaning of the ill-defined concept, "liability without fault." He reasoned that
the concept had not been argued, and its workability not seriously explored, 418 U.S. 323,
380 (1974) (White, J., dissenting). One California judge recently dismissed a million dollar
defamation suit against Los Angeles Magazine and KCET, holding Cal. Civ. Code §§ 45,
45a & 46 unconstitutional because the statute permits liability without fault. See L.A. Daily
Journal, July 13, 1982, at 1, col. 3.
318. Justice Brennan warned that the elusive Gertz standard would saddle the press with
an intolerable burden of guessing how a jury might assess the reasonableness of the steps it
took. See 418 U.S. 323, 366 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting). See infra note 339.
319. These considerations included evidence of actual loss, presumed injury, and uncon-
trolled jury discretion. 418 U.S. at 350.
320. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text for a comparison to the common law
malice standard.
321. See supra notes 32-33, 42, & 46 and accompanying text.
322. 101 L.T.R. 832 (1910). See supra notes 32-33, 42, & 46 and accompanying text.
323. See supra notes 32-33, 42, & 46 and accompanying text.
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element of the tort, because the third, fourth, and fifth elements were
presumed at common law. To establish fault under the newly proposed
standard, the plaintiff would be required to prove five elements of the
tort to receive compensatory damages. As explained below,3 "4 the rea-
sonable reader test would apply to elements one and three.
2. Publication to third parties
Publication in the law of defamatioi is a term of art.325 It requires
communication to someone other than the person defamed. The com-
munication can take the form of oral or. printed publication; or it can
be conveyed by gestures, paintings, pictures, or statues.326 In the case
of defamation in fiction, the book or magazine containing the defama-
tory material would be evidence of publication.
3. Falsity of facts
Having established that the reasonable reader would identify the
plaintiff as the character under element one, the plaintiff would next
prove falsity of facts. The plaintiff would have to prove that the defam-
atory words are false, and that a reasonable reader would believe them
to depict accurately the plaintiff. The falsity of the defamatory lan-
guage would be measured by the reasonable reader test. Would a rea-
sonable reader believe that the conduct or characteristics ascribed to
the character in fact were true of the plaintiff? If the answer is yes, then
the plaintiff has shown that he has been defamed.
To illustrate, in Bindrim the plaintiff would allege the similarities
between the character, Dr. Herford, and himself for element one, and
would also allege that the use of vulgar and abusive language was false
under element three. The issue would then be whether a reasonable
reader would believe that Dr. Bindrim used vulgar and abusive lan-
guage, and whether Dr. Bindrim in fact used such language. If the an-
swer to the first question is yes and the second is no, then Bindrim has
proved his case under elements one and three of the fault test.
In a case of fantasy, such as Pring, the test would be applied in
similar form. Would a reasonable reader believe that Pring performed
acts of fellatio at the Miss America Pageant, and did Pring in fact per-
form such acts? Here the fantastical aspects of the short story may re-
324. See infra notes 327-34 and accompanying text.
325. SACK, supra note 7, at 85 (citing Ostrowe v. Lee, 256 N.Y. 36, 38, 175 N.E. 505
(1931) (Cardozo, J.)).
326. See supra note 7.
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quire an inference.327 Although no reasonable reader would believe
that Pring levitated her coach during fellatio, a reasonable reader might
believe the inference that Pring was promiscuous. If the reasonable
reader believes either that Pring participated in fellatio or was promis-
cuous, and those charges were false, then Pring has been defamed.
Requiring the plaintiff to prove falsity of facts under element three
represents a departure from the common law. Under the common law,
once a plaintiff alleged falsity, falsity was presumed 328 Truth was an
affirmative defense raised by the defendant on which the defendant
had the burden of proof.329 Following New York Times and Gertz and
the imposition of "fault," commentators have split on the issue of the
"exact location" of the burden of proof as to truth or falsity.330 Indeed,
in Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn,3 3 ' the Court noted that it had
"carefully left open the question whether the First and Fourteenth
Amendments require. . . that truth be recognized as a defense in a
defamation action brought by a private person ... 332 Where a
plaintiff seeks compensatory damages from a media defendant, the
common law presumption of falsity should be abandoned and the
plaintiff should have to prove the statement false. Support for this posi-
tion can be found in Goldwater v. Ginzburg,333 in which the Second
Circuit stated that "the burden of establishing that the published mate-
rial was false is on the plaintiff.
'334
327. Defamatory language can be conveyed by an inference. See SACK supra note 7, at
50 ("A publisher is, of course, liable for the implications of what he has said or written, not
merely the specific, literal statements made.") (citing MacLeod v. Tribune Publishing Co.,
52 Cal. 2d 536, 547, 343 P.2d 36, 41 (1959) (emphasis in original). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 268-70.
328. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 581A comment a (1977). See supra note 43.
329. Id at § 58 lA(b). See supra note 44.
330. See Eaton, The American Law of Defamation hrough Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.
and Beyond'..An AnalyticalPrimer, 61 VA.L. REv. 1349, 1381-86 (1975). See also RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A comment b (1977).
331. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
332. Id at 490. Writing for the majority in Cox, Justice White avoided the "broader
question" of the location of the burden of proof, and "focus[ed] on the narrower interface
between press and privacy that the case presentled]." Id Who must bear the burden of
proof, and whether truth must be recognized as a defense, are issues which remain to be
addressed by the Supreme Court.
333. 414 F.2d 324 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1049 (1970).
334. Id. at 338. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 581A comment b
(1977):
At common law the majority position has been that although the plaintiff must
allege falsity in his complaint, the falsity of a defamatory communication is pre-
sumed. ... [T]ruth is an affirmative defense which must be raised by the defend-
ant and on which he has the burden of proof. . . . The practical effect of this rule
has been eroded, however, by the recent Supreme Court holdings that the First
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4. Culpability [formerly malice]
The fourth element of the tort, malice, was never clearly defined
by the various state courts under the common law.335 Some states re-
quired an intent to injure, and others held intent irrelevant.336 In defa-
mation in fiction cases, malice should be replaced with a modified
culpability standard.
Gertz requires that liability for defamation must be premised on
fault.3  Consequently, it is inappropriate to rely, as did the common
law, on a presumption of malice flowing automatically from a mere
showing that the defendant published defamatory matter. 38 Con-
versely, it would be anomalous to require, as a condition to the grant-
ing of compensatory damages, a showing of malice in either the
common law or constitutional sense. Such a requirement would in-
volve an undue shift in the sensitive balance between protection of rep-
utation and free speech contrary to the intention of the Gertz Court.
Rather, a more modest element of fault or culpability should be re-
quired. To satisfy the culpability or fault element, a plaintiff should be
required to show, at a minimum, that defendant acted with a want of
the reasonable and ordinary care which a publisher should exercise to
avoid injury to reputation. Obviously, a showing of specific intent to
injure reputation or reckless disregard for reputation would more than
suffice. However, the plaintiff should not be required to prove so great
a degree of culpability merely to recover compensatory damages, which
the common law granted without a showing of any fault at all.
To illustrate, in Pring, although the author claimed that the story
was "purely fictional," the editorial directors at Penthouse admitted
that there was reality in the story, as well.3 39 The editors knew that a
Amendment to the Constitution requires a finding of fault on the part of the de-
fendant regarding the truth or falsity of the communication. Pending further eluci-
dation by the Supreme Court, the Institute does not purport to setforth with precision
the extent to which the burden ofproof as to truth or falsity is now shifted to the
piainti.
Id (emphasis added).
335. See generally SACK, supra note 7, at 42-43.
336. Id
337. 418 U.S. 323, 347. See supra text accompanying notes 194-95. This proposal only
goes to private persons. Public figures must still prove actual malice.
338. See supra text accompanying notes 40-44.
339. Miss America Pageant, Inc., v. Penthouse Int'l. Ltd., 524 F. Supp. 1280, 1285
(D.C.N.J. 1981). In Miss America Pageant, the corporation sued Penthouse International,
Ltd. for defamation arising out of the short story, "Miss Wyoming Saves the World," which
appeared in the August 1979 issue of Penthouse magazine. See supra note 108 and accompa-
nying text. The court reasoned that the plaintiff failed to come forward with evidence from
which a jury could find actual malice, and the court granted the defendants' motion for
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Miss America Pageant was actually held in Atlantic City, that there is a
boardwalk in Atlantic City, and that there was a Miss Wyoming among
the contestants at the Pageant.340 After one of the senior editors at
Penthouse wrote the subtitle, "But She Blew The Contest With Her
Talent," and approved the artwork (including the drawing of a half-
naked female with a Wyoming banner), the editor admitted that "he
had qualms about it because the subject was the Miss America Pageant
and because that subject had been overdone satirically."3 4I The editor
sent the article to an attorney in the legal department at Penthouse for
review. After reading the manuscript, the attorney "inquired as to
whether the article was fiction.- 342 If an attorney in the legal depart-
ment of Penthouse read the story and questioned whether it was fiction,
arguably a reasonable reader might also have entertained the same
doubt.
Penthouse easily could have telephoned the Miss America Pageant
Corporation to determine whether the 1978 Miss Wyoming, who they
knew existed, was also a baton twirler. Given the doubts of their editor
and attorney, and the ease of determining whether the character could
be identified with an actual person, Penthouse's failure to investigate
can be characterized as want of the reasonable and ordinary care which
a publisher should exercise to avoid injury to reputation. 43
5. Injury
The fifth element, proof of actual injury, was imposed by the
Supreme Court in Gertz. In Gertz, the Court abolished the common
law's ancient presumption of injury for defamatory statements, noting
that "the presumption of injury is an oddity of tort law, for it allows
recovery of purportedly compensatory damages without evidence of ac-
tual loss."'3 4 Having characterized the presumption as an "oddity," the
Court demanded that private plaintiffs suing media defendants prove
summary judgment. Id at 1288. This case illustrates the need for a nationwide, uniform
fault standard. In the absence of such a standard, publishers who ship books and magazines
across state lines, if sued for defamation in fiction, may be required to litigate "fault" arising
out of the same piece of literature under varying standards, and must guess as to the extent
of any duty they owe.
340. Id
341. Id
342. Id (emphasis added).
343. See supra note 234 for discussion of the possibility that authors and publishers of
fiction may be found liable for compensatory damages without being found liable for puni-
tive damages.
344. 418 U.S. 323, 349-50 (1974).
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actual injury.345 Although the Court did not define actual injury, it
suggested that such recovery would include out-of-pocket loss, impair-
ment of reputation, standing in the community, personal humiliation,
and mental anguish and suffering.346 The Court did not impose a re-
quirement that the plaintiff assign an actual dollar value to the in-
jury.347 In defamation in fiction cases, courts might properly require
that damages should bear a fair and reasonable relationship to the in-
jury.34 Pring, for example, suffered out-of-pocket losses of $50.00,
349
but she recovered a jury award of $1.5 million in compensatory dam-
ages. Such an award permitted the jury, in its discretion, to "punish
unpopular opinion" rather than to compensate for actual injury.
350
C. Punitive Damage Standard
In Gertz the Court held "that the States may not permit recovery
of. . .punitive damages. . . when liability is not based on a showing
of knowledge of the falsity or reckless disregard for the truth.
351
When the double negatives of the Court's holding are removed, it is
clear that punitive damages are available when actual malice is proved.
As already discussed, when applied to fiction, proof of "falsity" created
a linguistic trap giving rise to strict liability for authors and
publishers.
35 2
To avoid automatic awards of punitive damages based on actual
malice, plaintiffs seeking damages in actions involving works of fiction
should have to prove a modified version of the New York Times actual
malice test. To suggest modification of the New York Times test is not
a radical proposal.353 Indeed, the Gertz formulation of the New York
345. Id
346. Id at 349-50.
347. Id.
348. See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29, 77 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("I
would hold unconstitutional jury authority to award damages which is unconfined by the
requirement that these awards bear a reasonable and purposeful relationship to the actual
harm done.").
349. Brief for Appellants at 55.
350. 418 U.S. 323., 350 (1974).
351. Id at 349. One commentator suggests that punitive damages should be precluded
from defamation actions since the function of punitive damages is deterrence, and deter-
rence of speech regardless of its content is inconsistent with the thrust of the commitment to
free expression. See Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorshop, 53 Tax. L. Rv. 422, 477
(1975).
352. See supra text accompanying notes 209-10.
353. Troubled by difficulties in dealing with the subjective New York Times test, some
courts and commentators have suggested abandonment of the "knowing or reckless false-
hood" standard and the adoption of Justice Harlan's still-born standard in Curtis Publishing
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Times test for an award of punitive damages already contains a modifi-
cation of the actual malice standard expressed in New York Times. In
New York Times, the Court demanded "knowledge that it was false or
• . . reckless disregard of whether it was false or not.' 35 4 Ten years
later, in Gertz, the Court stated that punitive damage awards must be
based on a showing of "knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for
the truth. 355 Whereas New York Times referred to falsity under both
prongs of the test, the Gertz decision referred to falsity under only one
prong. The New York Times Court appeared to create a dichotomy
between truth or falsity; the Gertz Court appeared to recognize that
disregard for truth would not necessarily involve falsity per se. When
the actual malice test is applied to fiction, therefore, the Supreme Court
should take the next logical step and eliminate the concept of falsity
entirely.
As modified, plaintiffs should be required to prove knowledge or
reckless disregard with respect to two elements of defamation: (1) iden-
tification and (2) likelihood of injury. Specifically, the jury should be
required to determine (a) whether the media defendant had knowledge
or manifested reckless disregard that the character in the work of
fiction reasonably could be identified as the plaintiff, and (b) whether
the media defendant had knowledge or manifested reckless disregard
that the conduct ascribed to the character is reasonably likely to injure
plaintiff's reputation.
For example, in Bindrim, Doubleday had notice that there was a
doctor claiming to be identified as the character in the novel but pub-
lished anyway.3 56 Arguably, having knowledge of the existence of a
likely counterpart to the character, Doubleday was reckless in its fail-
ure to investigate whether the conduct ascribed to the character was
likely to injure the potential plaintiff's reputation. If, hypothetically,
Doubleday had investigated and learned that Dr. Bindrim were vulgar
and abusive, then Doubleday could have published the paperback edi-
tion and argued the defense of truth. The defense of truth should re-
main available to a media defendant sued for defamation in fiction.
However, this defense should be applied to the defamatory characteris-
tics ascribed to the character. A publisher of fiction should not be
Co.: "highly unreasonable conduct constituting an extreme departure from the standards of
investigation and reporting ordinarily adhered to by responsible publishers." See SACK,
supra note 7 at 211 n.159 (citing Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967)).
354. 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964).
355. 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974).
356. 92 Cal. App. 3d at 72, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 36.
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asked to prove the truth of the genre, that the "fiction" is "true," but
rather that the defamatory characteristics ascribed to the character ac-
curately depict the plaintiff. As stated by the court in Miss America
Pageant, Inc., v. Penthouse Int., Ltd,357 "It would seem too simplistic
in the case of a fictional or satirical work simply to question whether
the author/publisher had the subjective intent to publish afalsity, since
such works are not intended to convey truth."
358
To prove actual malice for punitive damages, Pring should have
been required to show that Penthouse had knowledge of, or was reck-
less with respect to her identification, and the likelihood of injury. Ar-
guably, since Penthouse believed the story to be a piece of fantasy, it
had no knowledge of the existence of a real-life counterpart to the char-
acter, Charlene, nor had it any reason to doubt the author's representa-
tion that the story was purely imaginary.359 Since Penthouse had no
knowledge of the existence of a potential litigant, they could not be
considered reckless by their failure to foresee that the conduct ascribed
to the fictional character was reasonably likely to injure Pring's
reputation.360
In sum, to prove actual malice for punitive damages in works of
fiction, the concept of "falsity" should be eliminated entirely from the
Gertz test. Deletion of the reference to falsity would eliminate the po-
tential for strict liability in defamation actions for works of fiction. As
the California Supreme Court observed in Guglielmi v. Spelling-
Goldberg Productions,361 "[truthful and fictional accounts] have equal
constitutional status and each is as likely to fulfill the objectives under-
lying the constitutional guarantees of free expression."
362
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has not, and probably will not accept absolu-
tist arguments in the arena of tort versus first amendment issues. While
some commentators have argued for strict liability, and others have
suggested absolute privilege for fiction,363 this commentator believes
that the Court will continue to balance the public interest in preserving
reputation under the common law against the first amendment interest
357. 524 F. Supp. 1280 (D.N.J. 1981).
358. Id at 1284.
359. Id. at 1285.
360. See supra note 234.
361. 25 Cal. 3d 860, 603 P.2d 454, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1979).
362. Id. at 867, 603 P.2d at 461, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
363. See Hill, supra note 3, at 1308; see also Note, supra note 218, at 578-88; &supra note
317.
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in free expression. The recent imposition of strict liability on authors
and publishers of fiction is a misapplication of the Supreme Court's
policy in this area and undermines the fundamental right to free speech
and a free press. Therefore, a new fault standard and a modification of
the actual malice standard should be promulgated to avoid the auto-
matic and unwarranted imposition of punitive damages in actions for
defamation in fiction.
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